Political instability, economic inequality and social conflict: The case in Italy
Rising economic inequality may produce a contraction of political stability and a spread of social conflict, as suggested by the theory of relative power. Following this approach, participation in the political arena depends on the distribution of incomes, because the relative rich use thei...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Economists' Association of Vojvodina
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Panoeconomicus |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2019/1452-595X1903365I.pdf |
| Summary: | Rising economic inequality may produce a contraction of political stability
and a spread of social conflict, as suggested by the theory of relative
power. Following this approach, participation in the political arena depends
on the distribution of incomes, because the relative rich use their power to
ensure that the status quo do not change, while the relative poor are likely
to abandon the public arena when they realize that their demands will not be
discussed. Through the implementation of an index of political stability on
the Italian general elections of 2008 and 2013, this study empirically tests
whether political instability is linked with economic inequality. The
results of the analysis, which examines the sub-regional level, show that the
strengthening of economic inequality is a decisive factor affecting the
weight of the elites in the determination of economic and political choices,
and that it influences the distribution of votes between political blocks.
This comes at the disadvantage of the poorest who, aware of their lesser
chances to have influence, choose to change the character of their
participation. |
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| ISSN: | 1452-595X 2217-2386 |