De la méconnaissance

<p>I argue that the conception of «méconnaissance» put forward by René Girard should be understood in relation to what Popper calls objective knowledge rather than to the classical idea of knowledge as true and justified belief. Objective knowledge considers knowledge as a tool which is open t...

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Main Author: Paul Dumouchel
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Università degli Studi di Milano 2011-12-01
Series:Lebenswelt: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience
Online Access:http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/Lebenswelt/article/view/1593
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spelling doaj-a5a239a2ec9c492d8a9cd26a60a6973a2020-11-25T00:44:50ZdeuUniversità degli Studi di MilanoLebenswelt: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience2240-95992011-12-010110.13130/2240-9599/15931480De la méconnaissancePaul Dumouchel<p>I argue that the conception of «méconnaissance» put forward by René Girard should be understood in relation to what Popper calls objective knowledge rather than to the classical idea of knowledge as true and justified belief. Objective knowledge considers knowledge as a tool which is open to many uses and abuses. It allows us to make sense of Girard’s claim that «méconnaissance» grows as our knowledge increases and shows that knowledge and «méconnaissance» should not be understood as polar opposites. This suggests a different relationship between «méconnaissance» and revelation, that revelation does not spell the end of «méconnaissance» but rather initiates a different type of relationship between knowledge and «méconnaissance». I try to illustrate this last point with the help of two examples: Ernesto De Martino’s analysis of tarantism in <em>La terra del rimorso</em> and John Rawls’s idea of a veil of ignorance in his <em>A theory of justice</em>.<br /><br /></p>http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/Lebenswelt/article/view/1593
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Paul Dumouchel
spellingShingle Paul Dumouchel
De la méconnaissance
Lebenswelt: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience
author_facet Paul Dumouchel
author_sort Paul Dumouchel
title De la méconnaissance
title_short De la méconnaissance
title_full De la méconnaissance
title_fullStr De la méconnaissance
title_full_unstemmed De la méconnaissance
title_sort de la méconnaissance
publisher Università degli Studi di Milano
series Lebenswelt: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience
issn 2240-9599
publishDate 2011-12-01
description <p>I argue that the conception of «méconnaissance» put forward by René Girard should be understood in relation to what Popper calls objective knowledge rather than to the classical idea of knowledge as true and justified belief. Objective knowledge considers knowledge as a tool which is open to many uses and abuses. It allows us to make sense of Girard’s claim that «méconnaissance» grows as our knowledge increases and shows that knowledge and «méconnaissance» should not be understood as polar opposites. This suggests a different relationship between «méconnaissance» and revelation, that revelation does not spell the end of «méconnaissance» but rather initiates a different type of relationship between knowledge and «méconnaissance». I try to illustrate this last point with the help of two examples: Ernesto De Martino’s analysis of tarantism in <em>La terra del rimorso</em> and John Rawls’s idea of a veil of ignorance in his <em>A theory of justice</em>.<br /><br /></p>
url http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/Lebenswelt/article/view/1593
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