Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition

Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in the quality stage with the public firm acting a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Feng Leidong, Gu Mengdi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Polish Academy of Sciences 2016-06-01
Series:Archives of Control Sciences
Subjects:
vertical differentiation
endogenous timing
public firm
private firm
Online Access:http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/acsc.2016.26.issue-2/acsc-2016-0009/acsc-2016-0009.xml?format=INT
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spelling doaj-a567b09906994b749e4b79ac1bf873672020-11-25T03:22:19ZengPolish Academy of SciencesArchives of Control Sciences2300-26112016-06-0126216117510.1515/acsc-2016-0009acsc-2016-0009Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competitionFeng Leidong0Gu Mengdi1Jiaxing University, School of Business, Jiaxing, ChinaShanghai Jiao Tong University, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai, ChinaThis paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in the quality stage with the public firm acting as the high-quality producer and simultaneous play in the second period in the output stage turn out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/acsc.2016.26.issue-2/acsc-2016-0009/acsc-2016-0009.xml?format=INTvertical differentiationendogenous timingpublic firmprivate firm
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Feng Leidong
Gu Mengdi
spellingShingle Feng Leidong
Gu Mengdi
Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
Archives of Control Sciences
vertical differentiation
endogenous timing
public firm
private firm
author_facet Feng Leidong
Gu Mengdi
author_sort Feng Leidong
title Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
title_short Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
title_full Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
title_fullStr Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
title_full_unstemmed Endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with Cournot competition
title_sort endogenous timing in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly with cournot competition
publisher Polish Academy of Sciences
series Archives of Control Sciences
issn 2300-2611
publishDate 2016-06-01
description This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes under simultaneous and sequential output setting in a mixed duopoly in a vertically differentiated market. When the timing of the output game is determined endogenously, it is shown that simultaneous play in the quality stage with the public firm acting as the high-quality producer and simultaneous play in the second period in the output stage turn out to be the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which contrasts with the endogenous timing in a purely private duopoly.
topic vertical differentiation
endogenous timing
public firm
private firm
url http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/acsc.2016.26.issue-2/acsc-2016-0009/acsc-2016-0009.xml?format=INT
work_keys_str_mv AT fengleidong endogenoustiminginaverticallydifferentiatedmixedduopolywithcournotcompetition
AT gumengdi endogenoustiminginaverticallydifferentiatedmixedduopolywithcournotcompetition
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