Unitary Federalism–Germany Ignores the Original Spirit of its Constitution

• Main Author: Roland Sturm
• Format: Article
• Language: Catalan
• Published: Institut d'Estudis de l'Autogovern 2018-12-01
• Series: Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i Federals
• Subjects: coalitions; parties; financial equalization
• Online Access: http://presidencia.gencat.cat/web/.content/ambits_actuacio/desenvolupament_autogovern/iea/Publicacions/REAF/REAF_articles/REAF-28-desembre-2018/_reaf28-Sturm.pdf

Contrary to a federalism based on the subsidiarity principle, German federalism is now unitary in nature. Three reforms of federalism have contributed to undermining Länder self-rule (2006, 2009, and 2017). The governments on the federal and regional level dominate political decision-making. Parliaments suffer from neglect. Executive bargaining knows no limits. Even core competences of the Länder, such as their budgetary autonomy or education, have experienced federal intrusion. Länder initiatives, just as the federal government’s interventions, are not guided by a federal vision. What counts is political control and the expected efficiency of national solutions for policy problems (especially from the perspective of the federal government), improved policy outputs (especially as seen by the Länder), and electoral success, an aim of all parties on all political levels. What has no place in decision-making in Germany is proximity to the promise federalism makes, namely more regional autonomy, bringing politics closer to the people, regional participation, accountability and transparency.