Model for Design of Portfolio Venture Investment Contract When Taking Moral Hazards into Account
Portfolio investment is adopted by the venture capital to diversify those risks involved in project selection, investing or operating so that the venture capitalist can expect a relatively stable income and lower financing risks. Based on the design of portfolio investment contract with unlimited fu...
Main Authors: | L. Yin, Y. Liu, Z. Wang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Hindawi Limited
2020-01-01
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Series: | Scientific Programming |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8821371 |
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