Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia

This paper explores the level of independence of the National bank of the Republic of Macedonia by primarily focusing on the legal provisions that pertain to the key aspects for achieving and maintaining price stability. It provides a historical perspective of the evolution of the independence since...

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Main Author: Bezhoska Anita Angelovska
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sciendo 2017-09-01
Series:Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/jcbtp-2017-0020
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spelling doaj-a345f177f1914206a68fcaa4eed40ca32021-09-06T19:40:26ZengSciendoJournal of Central Banking Theory and Practice2336-92052017-09-0163356510.1515/jcbtp-2017-0020jcbtp-2017-0020Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of MacedoniaBezhoska Anita Angelovska0National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, Macedonia (the former Yugoslav Republic of)This paper explores the level of independence of the National bank of the Republic of Macedonia by primarily focusing on the legal provisions that pertain to the key aspects for achieving and maintaining price stability. It provides a historical perspective of the evolution of the independence since the first years of transition. The assessment of the independence of the NBRM is based on the index of Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), as one of the most commonly used indices, and the index of Jacome and Vazquez (2005), which incorporates some specific aspects relevant for transition economies. Both indices indicate that the legal independence of the NBRM has increased over the years and that the current legal framework provides a high level of independence. Yet, it should be emphasized that there is a room for further strengthening, in particular in the areas of policy formulation and the process of appointment of the non-executive members of the council of the NBRM. As the indices are based on the legal provisions, they can serve only as an indication of the actual independence of the central bank.https://doi.org/10.1515/jcbtp-2017-0020central bank independencemonetary policyindicesmacedonia
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Bezhoska Anita Angelovska
spellingShingle Bezhoska Anita Angelovska
Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice
central bank independence
monetary policy
indices
macedonia
author_facet Bezhoska Anita Angelovska
author_sort Bezhoska Anita Angelovska
title Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
title_short Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
title_full Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
title_fullStr Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
title_full_unstemmed Central Bank Independence - the Case of the National Bank of Republic of Macedonia
title_sort central bank independence - the case of the national bank of republic of macedonia
publisher Sciendo
series Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice
issn 2336-9205
publishDate 2017-09-01
description This paper explores the level of independence of the National bank of the Republic of Macedonia by primarily focusing on the legal provisions that pertain to the key aspects for achieving and maintaining price stability. It provides a historical perspective of the evolution of the independence since the first years of transition. The assessment of the independence of the NBRM is based on the index of Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), as one of the most commonly used indices, and the index of Jacome and Vazquez (2005), which incorporates some specific aspects relevant for transition economies. Both indices indicate that the legal independence of the NBRM has increased over the years and that the current legal framework provides a high level of independence. Yet, it should be emphasized that there is a room for further strengthening, in particular in the areas of policy formulation and the process of appointment of the non-executive members of the council of the NBRM. As the indices are based on the legal provisions, they can serve only as an indication of the actual independence of the central bank.
topic central bank independence
monetary policy
indices
macedonia
url https://doi.org/10.1515/jcbtp-2017-0020
work_keys_str_mv AT bezhoskaanitaangelovska centralbankindependencethecaseofthenationalbankofrepublicofmacedonia
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