Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets
We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio r...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Celal Bayar University
2014-12-01
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Series: | Yönetim ve Ekonomi |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C21S22014/269-280.pdf |
Summary: | We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability. |
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ISSN: | 1302-0064 1302-0064 |