Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets

We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio r...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sadettin Haluk ÇİTÇİ
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Celal Bayar University 2014-12-01
Series:Yönetim ve Ekonomi
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www2.bayar.edu.tr/yonetimekonomi/dergi/pdf/C21S22014/269-280.pdf
Description
Summary:We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor's ability to identify the manager's actual type. More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager's actual ability.
ISSN:1302-0064
1302-0064