Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits

In “Agonism as Deliberation” (Knops 2007) I suggest a reconciliation between Mouffe’s agonist version of democracy, adjusted to preserve consistency, and deliberation. Here I reply to two subsequent criticisms of this project: Gürsözlü (2009) and Fives (2009). Although both hold agonism and delib...

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Main Author: Knops Andrew
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade 2012-01-01
Series:Filozofija i Društvo
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2012/0353-57381204151K.pdf
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spelling doaj-a30d06321db14177939174d86d5f01682020-11-24T22:45:56ZdeuInstitute for Philosophy and Social Theory, BelgradeFilozofija i Društvo0353-57382012-01-0123415116910.2298/FID1204151KIntegrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefitsKnops AndrewIn “Agonism as Deliberation” (Knops 2007) I suggest a reconciliation between Mouffe’s agonist version of democracy, adjusted to preserve consistency, and deliberation. Here I reply to two subsequent criticisms of this project: Gürsözlü (2009) and Fives (2009). Although both hold agonism and deliberation incompatible impossible, they do so from opposing perspectives. Gürsözlü defends Mouffe’s agonism as distinct and coherent on the basis of what he considers a correct understanding of her concept of hegemony. Fives argues Mouffe’s approach is separate but incoherent, and should be rejected. Against these two conflicting positions, I seek to demonstrate not only that integration between agonism and democracy is possible, but that it has distinct benefits for both agonism and deliberative theory. Divested of its contradictory assertion that universal rational consensus is impossible in principle, agonism can be interpreted as theory of the moment of difference within a broader deliberative dialectic that seeks to move from more to less partial consensus. Conceived in this way, we can better appreciate how these two approaches can complement one another, in pursuing shared goals, rather than the static and unnecessary opposition offered by the two critics I address here.http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2012/0353-57381204151K.pdfdemocracyagonismdeliberationMouffeHabermas
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Knops Andrew
spellingShingle Knops Andrew
Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits
Filozofija i Društvo
democracy
agonism
deliberation
Mouffe
Habermas
author_facet Knops Andrew
author_sort Knops Andrew
title Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits
title_short Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits
title_full Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits
title_fullStr Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits
title_full_unstemmed Integrating agonism with deliberation: Realising the benefits
title_sort integrating agonism with deliberation: realising the benefits
publisher Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
series Filozofija i Društvo
issn 0353-5738
publishDate 2012-01-01
description In “Agonism as Deliberation” (Knops 2007) I suggest a reconciliation between Mouffe’s agonist version of democracy, adjusted to preserve consistency, and deliberation. Here I reply to two subsequent criticisms of this project: Gürsözlü (2009) and Fives (2009). Although both hold agonism and deliberation incompatible impossible, they do so from opposing perspectives. Gürsözlü defends Mouffe’s agonism as distinct and coherent on the basis of what he considers a correct understanding of her concept of hegemony. Fives argues Mouffe’s approach is separate but incoherent, and should be rejected. Against these two conflicting positions, I seek to demonstrate not only that integration between agonism and democracy is possible, but that it has distinct benefits for both agonism and deliberative theory. Divested of its contradictory assertion that universal rational consensus is impossible in principle, agonism can be interpreted as theory of the moment of difference within a broader deliberative dialectic that seeks to move from more to less partial consensus. Conceived in this way, we can better appreciate how these two approaches can complement one another, in pursuing shared goals, rather than the static and unnecessary opposition offered by the two critics I address here.
topic democracy
agonism
deliberation
Mouffe
Habermas
url http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2012/0353-57381204151K.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT knopsandrew integratingagonismwithdeliberationrealisingthebenefits
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