Challenges to the strategic art at the beginning of XXI century – the twelve fundamental problems that strategists cannot cope with
The main aim of this research is to attract security and defense practi-tioners as well as theorists attention to the common as well as frequent-ly spotted fundamental problems concerning developing and imple-menting strategies of using force to solve security matters in conflicts. The research iden...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Military University of Land Forces
2019-09-01
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Series: | Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces |
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Online Access: | http://zeszyty-naukowe.awl.edu.pl/gicid/01.3001.0013.5002 |
Summary: | The main aim of this research is to attract security and defense practi-tioners as well as theorists attention to the common as well as frequent-ly spotted fundamental problems concerning developing and imple-menting strategies of using force to solve security matters in conflicts. The research identified that ineffective strategies are often hampered by the twelve fundamental errors that strategists cannot cope with. Belong to them: 1) inadequate level of knowledge among military and political leaders concerning the strategic art and strategy itself; 2) hardship in defining the end state of the operation as well as creating unachievable strategic goals; 3) formulating a strategy on flawed as-sumptions; 4) inability to find the balance among the key components of each strategy like: goals, ways and means; 5) difficulties in achieving a political and military dialogue; 6) overestimating the effectiveness and usefulness of “hard” power as well deprecating utility of non-military power; 7) underestimating the influence of social and cultural aspects on the desired end state of the operation; 8) developing strategy upon inadequate theoretical and practical models; 9) using the comprehen-sive approach of developing strategy in an uninspired and mechanical way to achieve a competitive advantage over opponent; 10) measuring the success of the operation through the prism of short-term and tacti-cal effects instead of long-term and systemic one; 11) viewing an “exit strategy” as a predetermined date of withdrawal military forces from operation; 12) disregarding usage of the “just” strategies in accordance with international rules of law. Eliminating those errors form the con-temporary practice will make all implemented strategies far for effec-tive in its nature as well as significantly strengthen the probability of success in complex security situation where the force is intended to be applied.
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ISSN: | 2544-7122 2545-0719 |