EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES

In this article, we discuss reasoning of consumers and strategic adoption behavior of producers and retailers with respect to genetically modified-free (GM-free) quality standards in Europe. We argue that there are three major reasons why a mandatory GM labeling scheme differs from a voluntary proce...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Thomas J. VENUS, Justus H.H. WESSELER
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Slovak University of Agriculture 2015-11-01
Series:Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics
Subjects:
GMO
Online Access:http://roaae.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RAAE_02_2015_Venus_Wesseler.pdf
id doaj-a24420e3d44a4bb593ba40d36f643522
record_format Article
spelling doaj-a24420e3d44a4bb593ba40d36f6435222020-11-24T23:16:56ZengSlovak University of AgricultureReview of Agricultural and Applied Economics1336-92612015-11-01182202710.15414/raae.2015.18.02.20-27600-1EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIESThomas J. VENUSJustus H.H. WESSELERIn this article, we discuss reasoning of consumers and strategic adoption behavior of producers and retailers with respect to genetically modified-free (GM-free) quality standards in Europe. We argue that there are three major reasons why a mandatory GM labeling scheme differs from a voluntary process-based GM-free labeling scheme regarding the effect on consumer demand: (1) while both mandatory and voluntary labels signal that products containing, or produced with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are of lower quality, experiments show that the signaling effect is stronger in the case of mandatory labels; (2) some consumers care more about the effects of consuming GMOs directly (i.e., labeled GMO) compared to consuming only products derived from GMOs (i.e., non-labeled GM-free); and (3) mandatory labeling shifts some of the labeling burden to the GM producer making the GM product relatively more expensive compared to the case of voluntary GM-free labeling. We discuss reasons why producers or retailers set or implement a voluntary GM-free production standard. To illustrate how the firm adoption theory can be extended, we use a real option game framework in a duopolistic setting and show that it can be beneficial to offer a GM-free product without labeling it. We show that this can be the case if investing without labeling works as a pre-investment or option to extend to reduce the investment cost of implementing a label in the case of an increase in demand. Finally, we provide a list of important events that have affected the evolution of the GM-free market in Europe.http://roaae.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RAAE_02_2015_Venus_Wesseler.pdfprivate quality standardsvoluntary labelGM-freeGMOreal option game
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Thomas J. VENUS
Justus H.H. WESSELER
spellingShingle Thomas J. VENUS
Justus H.H. WESSELER
EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics
private quality standards
voluntary label
GM-free
GMO
real option game
author_facet Thomas J. VENUS
Justus H.H. WESSELER
author_sort Thomas J. VENUS
title EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
title_short EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
title_full EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
title_fullStr EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
title_full_unstemmed EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN GM-FREE STANDARDS: REASONING OF CONSUMERS AND STRATEGIC ADOPTION BY COMPANIES
title_sort evolution of european gm-free standards: reasoning of consumers and strategic adoption by companies
publisher Slovak University of Agriculture
series Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics
issn 1336-9261
publishDate 2015-11-01
description In this article, we discuss reasoning of consumers and strategic adoption behavior of producers and retailers with respect to genetically modified-free (GM-free) quality standards in Europe. We argue that there are three major reasons why a mandatory GM labeling scheme differs from a voluntary process-based GM-free labeling scheme regarding the effect on consumer demand: (1) while both mandatory and voluntary labels signal that products containing, or produced with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are of lower quality, experiments show that the signaling effect is stronger in the case of mandatory labels; (2) some consumers care more about the effects of consuming GMOs directly (i.e., labeled GMO) compared to consuming only products derived from GMOs (i.e., non-labeled GM-free); and (3) mandatory labeling shifts some of the labeling burden to the GM producer making the GM product relatively more expensive compared to the case of voluntary GM-free labeling. We discuss reasons why producers or retailers set or implement a voluntary GM-free production standard. To illustrate how the firm adoption theory can be extended, we use a real option game framework in a duopolistic setting and show that it can be beneficial to offer a GM-free product without labeling it. We show that this can be the case if investing without labeling works as a pre-investment or option to extend to reduce the investment cost of implementing a label in the case of an increase in demand. Finally, we provide a list of important events that have affected the evolution of the GM-free market in Europe.
topic private quality standards
voluntary label
GM-free
GMO
real option game
url http://roaae.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/RAAE_02_2015_Venus_Wesseler.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT thomasjvenus evolutionofeuropeangmfreestandardsreasoningofconsumersandstrategicadoptionbycompanies
AT justushhwesseler evolutionofeuropeangmfreestandardsreasoningofconsumersandstrategicadoptionbycompanies
_version_ 1725585648847421440