Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain
Why does the European election fail to produce competition between European policy alternatives despite the increased politicization of European integration and efforts to connect election results to the Commission Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten process? In this article I theorize the European...
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doaj-a1d4d691ad1f4261b6a4aff596173a072020-11-25T01:45:04ZengCogitatioPolitics and Governance2183-24632020-02-0181414910.17645/pag.v8i1.25171293Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists GainZoe Lefkofridi0Department of Political Science and Salzburg Center of European Studies, University of Salzburg, AustriaWhy does the European election fail to produce competition between European policy alternatives despite the increased politicization of European integration and efforts to connect election results to the Commission Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten process? In this article I theorize the European arena’s incentive structure for political competition by synthesizing Strøm’s (1990) behavioral theory of competitive parties (votes, office, policy) and Bartolini’s (1999, 2000) four dimensions of electoral competition (contestability, availability, decidability, and incumbent vulnerability). I model EU decidability (party differentials on EU policy) and formulate specific expectations about party differentiation by considering parties’ vote-, office-, and policy-seeking motives under the European arena’s specific conditions. How parties behave under the specific incentive structure of the European arena matters for the EU’s development as a polity.https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2517dimensions of competitioneuropean electioneuropean parliamenteuropean unionpolitical partiesparty goals |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Zoe Lefkofridi |
spellingShingle |
Zoe Lefkofridi Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain Politics and Governance dimensions of competition european election european parliament european union political parties party goals |
author_facet |
Zoe Lefkofridi |
author_sort |
Zoe Lefkofridi |
title |
Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain |
title_short |
Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain |
title_full |
Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain |
title_fullStr |
Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain |
title_full_unstemmed |
Competition in the European Arena: How the Rules of the Game Help Nationalists Gain |
title_sort |
competition in the european arena: how the rules of the game help nationalists gain |
publisher |
Cogitatio |
series |
Politics and Governance |
issn |
2183-2463 |
publishDate |
2020-02-01 |
description |
Why does the European election fail to produce competition between European policy alternatives despite the increased politicization of European integration and efforts to connect election results to the Commission Presidency via the Spitzenkandidaten process? In this article I theorize the European arena’s incentive structure for political competition by synthesizing Strøm’s (1990) behavioral theory of competitive parties (votes, office, policy) and Bartolini’s (1999, 2000) four dimensions of electoral competition (contestability, availability, decidability, and incumbent vulnerability). I model EU decidability (party differentials on EU policy) and formulate specific expectations about party differentiation by considering parties’ vote-, office-, and policy-seeking motives under the European arena’s specific conditions. How parties behave under the specific incentive structure of the European arena matters for the EU’s development as a polity. |
topic |
dimensions of competition european election european parliament european union political parties party goals |
url |
https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/2517 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT zoelefkofridi competitionintheeuropeanarenahowtherulesofthegamehelpnationalistsgain |
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