La naturalidad del escepticismo
In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to C...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2013-02-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/24168 |
Summary: | In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices. |
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ISSN: | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |