Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature

My major aim in this paper is to discuss whether the property of recursion provides a good explanation of human specificity. In so doing, I will analyze two approaches to the study of natural language: the computational and the anthropological conceptions. The main conclusion of this work is twofold...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Sergio Mota
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Universidad del Valle 2018-02-01
Series:Praxis Filosófica
Online Access:http://praxis.univalle.edu.co/index.php/praxis/article/view/6154
id doaj-9f9725594c4f47a48ff8ca30a8256be9
record_format Article
spelling doaj-9f9725594c4f47a48ff8ca30a8256be92020-11-25T00:32:03ZdeuUniversidad del VallePraxis Filosófica0120-46882389-93872018-02-014612514910.25100/pfilosofica.v0i46.61546154Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human natureSergio Mota0Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, EspañaMy major aim in this paper is to discuss whether the property of recursion provides a good explanation of human specificity. In so doing, I will analyze two approaches to the study of natural language: the computational and the anthropological conceptions. The main conclusion of this work is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that recursion is not a good explanation of human essence. On the other hand, what is, indeed, specifically human is the construction of a mythology with a metaphysical slant, in this particular case, in the guise of the language of science.http://praxis.univalle.edu.co/index.php/praxis/article/view/6154
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Sergio Mota
spellingShingle Sergio Mota
Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
Praxis Filosófica
author_facet Sergio Mota
author_sort Sergio Mota
title Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
title_short Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
title_full Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
title_fullStr Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
title_full_unstemmed Two conceptions of language: Wittgenstein and Chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
title_sort two conceptions of language: wittgenstein and chomsky on recursion as a “good” explanation of human nature
publisher Universidad del Valle
series Praxis Filosófica
issn 0120-4688
2389-9387
publishDate 2018-02-01
description My major aim in this paper is to discuss whether the property of recursion provides a good explanation of human specificity. In so doing, I will analyze two approaches to the study of natural language: the computational and the anthropological conceptions. The main conclusion of this work is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that recursion is not a good explanation of human essence. On the other hand, what is, indeed, specifically human is the construction of a mythology with a metaphysical slant, in this particular case, in the guise of the language of science.
url http://praxis.univalle.edu.co/index.php/praxis/article/view/6154
work_keys_str_mv AT sergiomota twoconceptionsoflanguagewittgensteinandchomskyonrecursionasagoodexplanationofhumannature
_version_ 1725321188290330624