Indukcja, dedukcja i szlaki mamutów

• Main Author: Mieszko Tałasiewicz
• Format: Article
• Language: deu
• Published: Copernicus Center Press 2007-06-01
• Series: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
• Subjects: inductionism; deductionism; inductionism-deductionism controversion; Larry Laudan; Karl Popper
• Online Access: http://zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/280

The paper examines various instances of 'inductionism-deductionism' controversion (e.g. Popper vs Vienna Circle or the formulation of Laudan's argument against realism as pessimistic meta-induction vs. kind of deduction). The thesis is that the form of logical reconstruction of our reasoning (in every-day life as well as in science or meta-science) as induction or deduction is irrelevant as to the rational evaluation of this reasoning. Thus the inductionism-deductionism controversion is claimed vacuous. Instead of formal logic a sort of evolutionary epistemology is called for adequate account, since - as it is argued for - the degree of sensitivity to counterexamples contradicting our theories and hypotheses is a kind of adaptation to environment.