Summary: | The history of how the nonviolent proposal of Mahatma Gandhi resonates with Chinese intellectuals is a history of variability. In the late Forties, it seems appealing to some Chinese politicians who actually apply non-cooperative means, whereas during the Twenties, even if it is not at all a dominant idea, it resonates well with some Chinese intellectuals. However, during the Thirties, after Gandhi refused to compromise with Stalin, and while the Marxist proposal disseminated worldwide, the nonviolent leanings were paling. In Hu Yuzhi we find an example of this track toward nonviolence: he was a strong supporter during the Twenties, becoming an opponent in the Thirties.
Copious are the difficulties in combining other political proposal with Gandhism, itself a comprehensive proposal, and not just a political one. Some perceived Gandhism as a competitor in the supremacy over the masses. Others disagreed about the possibility to use violent means. Another leading theme of objection concerned the industrialization, strongly opposed by Gandhi because of its deadly effects over the Indian population. Generally, an intense opposition came from the misunderstanding of the nonviolent path as a passive one. Moreover, the consideration of Gandhi’s experiments changed from it being perceived as “native” (because it came from an Asian country, and in opposition to Marxism coming from Europe) to a perception as an external one when Marxism was “sinicised.” Anyway, the main reason of the difficulty in implementing Gandhism is that it does not aim to triumph over the opponents, but it is rather a way to individuate and assert the Truth (satyagraha), with both side winning. When this intent is absent, it is impossible to realize it.
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