Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks
This paper considers a line-of-sight underwater acoustic (UWA) sensor network consisting of M underwater sensor nodes randomly deployed according to uniform distribution within a vertical half-disc (the so-called trusted zone). The sensor nodes report their sensed data to a sink node on water surfac...
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doaj-9ddfbdf9c5b04f20a86ca4db08c7d10b2021-03-29T21:13:03ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362018-01-016444594447210.1109/ACCESS.2018.28639458425971Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor NetworksWaqas Aman0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2443-1302Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6768-0886Junaid Qadir2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9466-2475Haris Pervaiz3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8364-4682Qiang Ni4https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4593-1656Department of Electrical engineering, Information Technology University, Lahore, PakistanDepartment of Electrical engineering, Information Technology University, Lahore, PakistanDepartment of Electrical engineering, Information Technology University, Lahore, PakistanInstitute of Communication Systems, Home of 5GIC, University of Surrey, Guildford, U.K.School of Computing and Communications, Lancaster University, Lancaster, U.K.This paper considers a line-of-sight underwater acoustic (UWA) sensor network consisting of M underwater sensor nodes randomly deployed according to uniform distribution within a vertical half-disc (the so-called trusted zone). The sensor nodes report their sensed data to a sink node on water surface on a shared UWA reporting channel in a time-division multiple-access fashion, while an active-yet-invisible adversary (so-called Eve) is present in the close vicinity who aims to inject malicious data into the system by impersonating some Alice node. To this end, this paper first considers an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) UWA channel, and proposes a novel, multiple-feature-based, two-step method at the sink node to thwart the potential impersonation attack by Eve. Specifically, the sink node exploits the noisy estimates of the distance, the angle of arrival, and the location of the transmit node as device fingerprints to carry out a number of binary hypothesis tests (for impersonation detection) as well as a number of maximum-likelihood (ML) hypothesis tests (for transmitter identification when no impersonation is detected). We provide closed-form expressions for the error probabilities (i.e., the performance) of most of the hypothesis tests. We then consider the case of a UWA with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss, and derive a ML distance estimator as well as the corresponding Cramer-Rao bound. We then invoke the proposed two-step, impersonation detection framework by utilizing distance as the sole feature. Finally, we provide detailed simulation results for both AWGN UWA channel and the UWA channel with colored noise. Simulation results verify that the proposed scheme is indeed effective for a UWA channel with the colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8425971/Impersonation detectionphysical layer authenticationhypothesis testingunderwater acoustic sensor networksmaximum likelihood detection & estimation and Cramer-Rao bound |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Waqas Aman Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman Junaid Qadir Haris Pervaiz Qiang Ni |
spellingShingle |
Waqas Aman Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman Junaid Qadir Haris Pervaiz Qiang Ni Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks IEEE Access Impersonation detection physical layer authentication hypothesis testing underwater acoustic sensor networks maximum likelihood detection & estimation and Cramer-Rao bound |
author_facet |
Waqas Aman Muhammad Mahboob Ur Rahman Junaid Qadir Haris Pervaiz Qiang Ni |
author_sort |
Waqas Aman |
title |
Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks |
title_short |
Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks |
title_full |
Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks |
title_fullStr |
Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks |
title_full_unstemmed |
Impersonation Detection in Line-of-Sight Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks |
title_sort |
impersonation detection in line-of-sight underwater acoustic sensor networks |
publisher |
IEEE |
series |
IEEE Access |
issn |
2169-3536 |
publishDate |
2018-01-01 |
description |
This paper considers a line-of-sight underwater acoustic (UWA) sensor network consisting of M underwater sensor nodes randomly deployed according to uniform distribution within a vertical half-disc (the so-called trusted zone). The sensor nodes report their sensed data to a sink node on water surface on a shared UWA reporting channel in a time-division multiple-access fashion, while an active-yet-invisible adversary (so-called Eve) is present in the close vicinity who aims to inject malicious data into the system by impersonating some Alice node. To this end, this paper first considers an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) UWA channel, and proposes a novel, multiple-feature-based, two-step method at the sink node to thwart the potential impersonation attack by Eve. Specifically, the sink node exploits the noisy estimates of the distance, the angle of arrival, and the location of the transmit node as device fingerprints to carry out a number of binary hypothesis tests (for impersonation detection) as well as a number of maximum-likelihood (ML) hypothesis tests (for transmitter identification when no impersonation is detected). We provide closed-form expressions for the error probabilities (i.e., the performance) of most of the hypothesis tests. We then consider the case of a UWA with colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss, and derive a ML distance estimator as well as the corresponding Cramer-Rao bound. We then invoke the proposed two-step, impersonation detection framework by utilizing distance as the sole feature. Finally, we provide detailed simulation results for both AWGN UWA channel and the UWA channel with colored noise. Simulation results verify that the proposed scheme is indeed effective for a UWA channel with the colored noise and frequency-dependent pathloss. |
topic |
Impersonation detection physical layer authentication hypothesis testing underwater acoustic sensor networks maximum likelihood detection & estimation and Cramer-Rao bound |
url |
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8425971/ |
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