Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game

Show other versions (1)

In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, coll...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Aitor Ciarreta, Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad de Chile 2013-01-01
Series:Estudios de Economía
Online Access:https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/31033
id doaj-9da9a5b1ed9440728fc6ec3764dbe71d
record_format Article
spelling doaj-9da9a5b1ed9440728fc6ec3764dbe71d2020-11-25T00:24:47ZengUniversidad de ChileEstudios de Economía0304-27580718-52862013-01-0140224725331033Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot gameAitor Ciarreta0Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita1Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Universidad del País Vasco, BilbaoDepto. Estudios Económicos y Financieros, Universitas Miguel Hernández, Elche (Alicante)In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/31033
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Aitor Ciarreta
Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
spellingShingle Aitor Ciarreta
Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
Estudios de Economía
author_facet Aitor Ciarreta
Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
author_sort Aitor Ciarreta
title Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_short Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_full Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_fullStr Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_full_unstemmed Collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a Cournot game
title_sort collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags, with an application to a cournot game
publisher Universidad de Chile
series Estudios de Economía
issn 0304-2758
0718-5286
publishDate 2013-01-01
description In this paper we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms that compete à la Cournot. It is shown how in the presence of detection lags optimal punishments fail to restore cooperation as long as the number of lags increases. Moreover, collusion sustainability is difficult to achieve also if the number of firms is low.
url https://estudiosdeeconomia.uchile.cl/index.php/EDE/article/view/31033
work_keys_str_mv AT aitorciarreta collusionsustainabilitywithoptimalpunishmentsanddetectionlagswithanapplicationtoacournotgame
AT carlosgutierrezhita collusionsustainabilitywithoptimalpunishmentsanddetectionlagswithanapplicationtoacournotgame
_version_ 1725351718144704512

Similar Items