A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion

The article aims to uncover a deep ambivalence in the figure of Job, as it is presented in the book of the same title, especially in the latter’s “poetry” or dialogue section. This ambivalence corresponds to and in fact emerges from what appears to be a pragmatic parado...

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Main Author: Heiko Schulz
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2019-03-01
Series:Religions
Subjects:
Job
sin
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/10/3/201
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spelling doaj-9d2b1356e2ea4ab28eed338fdb53e9ff2020-11-24T21:54:25ZengMDPI AGReligions2077-14442019-03-0110320110.3390/rel10030201rel10030201A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of ReligionHeiko Schulz0Department of Protestant Theology, Goethe University Frankfurt, 60629 Frankfurt, GermanyThe article aims to uncover a deep ambivalence in the figure of Job, as it is presented in the book of the same title, especially in the latter’s “poetry” or dialogue section. This ambivalence corresponds to and in fact emerges from what appears to be a pragmatic paradox: Job is in the wrong (i.e., guilty) in relation to God, precisely by claiming to be right (i.e., innocent); conversely, he can be and must be considered right, if and to the extent that he honestly renounces the latter claim. Accordingly, he cannot both be right (or wrong) and claim to be right or (or wrong)—a special case of what is observed, within epistemology, as an incompatibility of truth and assertibility conditions. In the present text, this core thesis is developed in four steps: the first introduces and briefly contextualizes the claim; the second tries to demonstrate that it provides at least sufficient means for making narrative sense of the book as a whole and, in particular, the controversy between Job and his friends; a third paragraph tackles the (philosophical and/or theological) presuppositions and implications of the thesis from a Christian standpoint, whereas the conclusion addresses the question of if and how the previous findings bear upon the rationality issue. Here, a final paradox emerges: that which would appear to be most rational from a Christian perspective (the task of sin consciousness) must be deemed humanly impossible to fulfill; considering the latter possible renders the task futile, hence irrational.http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/10/3/201JobJob’s friendsKierkegaardtruthassertibilityparadoxsinretribution principle
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Heiko Schulz
spellingShingle Heiko Schulz
A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion
Religions
Job
Job’s friends
Kierkegaard
truth
assertibility
paradox
sin
retribution principle
author_facet Heiko Schulz
author_sort Heiko Schulz
title A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion
title_short A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion
title_full A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion
title_fullStr A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion
title_full_unstemmed A Claim Forfeiting Its Own Right. Why Job Got It Wrong—and Why This Matters for the Rationality of Religion
title_sort claim forfeiting its own right. why job got it wrong—and why this matters for the rationality of religion
publisher MDPI AG
series Religions
issn 2077-1444
publishDate 2019-03-01
description The article aims to uncover a deep ambivalence in the figure of Job, as it is presented in the book of the same title, especially in the latter’s “poetry” or dialogue section. This ambivalence corresponds to and in fact emerges from what appears to be a pragmatic paradox: Job is in the wrong (i.e., guilty) in relation to God, precisely by claiming to be right (i.e., innocent); conversely, he can be and must be considered right, if and to the extent that he honestly renounces the latter claim. Accordingly, he cannot both be right (or wrong) and claim to be right or (or wrong)—a special case of what is observed, within epistemology, as an incompatibility of truth and assertibility conditions. In the present text, this core thesis is developed in four steps: the first introduces and briefly contextualizes the claim; the second tries to demonstrate that it provides at least sufficient means for making narrative sense of the book as a whole and, in particular, the controversy between Job and his friends; a third paragraph tackles the (philosophical and/or theological) presuppositions and implications of the thesis from a Christian standpoint, whereas the conclusion addresses the question of if and how the previous findings bear upon the rationality issue. Here, a final paradox emerges: that which would appear to be most rational from a Christian perspective (the task of sin consciousness) must be deemed humanly impossible to fulfill; considering the latter possible renders the task futile, hence irrational.
topic Job
Job’s friends
Kierkegaard
truth
assertibility
paradox
sin
retribution principle
url http://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/10/3/201
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