Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks

The problems of recovering the state of power systems and detecting the instances of bad data have been widely studied in literature. Nevertheless, these two operations have been designed and optimized for the most part in isolation. Specifically, state estimators are optimized based on the minimum...

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Main Authors: Ali Tajer, Saurabh Sihag, Khawla Alnajjar
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2019-01-01
Series:Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8952865/
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spelling doaj-9b08cf7a6f8e4fb38e976bc105b1859d2021-04-23T16:10:16ZengIEEEJournal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy2196-54202019-01-01751071108010.1007/s40565-019-0561-28952865Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacksAli Tajer0Saurabh Sihag1Khawla Alnajjar2Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,Troy,NY,USA,12180Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,Troy,NY,USA,12180University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates,Sharjah,UAEThe problems of recovering the state of power systems and detecting the instances of bad data have been widely studied in literature. Nevertheless, these two operations have been designed and optimized for the most part in isolation. Specifically, state estimators are optimized based on the minimum mean-square error criteria, which is only optimal when the source of distortions in the data is Gaussian random noise. Hence, the state estimators fail to perform optimality when the data is further contaminated by bad data, which cannot necessarily be modeled by additive Gaussian terms. The problem of power state estimation has been studied extensively. But the fundamental performance limits and the attendant decision rules are unknown when the data is potentially compromised by random bad data (due to sensor failures) or structured bad data (due to cyber attacks, which are also referred to false data injection attacks). This paper provides a general framework that formalizes the underlying connection between state estimation and bad data detection routines. We aim to carry out the combined tasks of detecting the presence of random and structured bad data, and form accurate estimations for the state of power grid. This paper characterizes the optimal detectors and estimators. Furthermore, the gains with respect to the existing state estimators and bad data detectors are established through numerical evaluations.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8952865/State estimationPower system securityBad data detectionData injection attack
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ali Tajer
Saurabh Sihag
Khawla Alnajjar
spellingShingle Ali Tajer
Saurabh Sihag
Khawla Alnajjar
Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy
State estimation
Power system security
Bad data detection
Data injection attack
author_facet Ali Tajer
Saurabh Sihag
Khawla Alnajjar
author_sort Ali Tajer
title Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
title_short Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
title_full Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
title_fullStr Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
title_full_unstemmed Non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
title_sort non-linear state recovery in power system under bad data and cyber attacks
publisher IEEE
series Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy
issn 2196-5420
publishDate 2019-01-01
description The problems of recovering the state of power systems and detecting the instances of bad data have been widely studied in literature. Nevertheless, these two operations have been designed and optimized for the most part in isolation. Specifically, state estimators are optimized based on the minimum mean-square error criteria, which is only optimal when the source of distortions in the data is Gaussian random noise. Hence, the state estimators fail to perform optimality when the data is further contaminated by bad data, which cannot necessarily be modeled by additive Gaussian terms. The problem of power state estimation has been studied extensively. But the fundamental performance limits and the attendant decision rules are unknown when the data is potentially compromised by random bad data (due to sensor failures) or structured bad data (due to cyber attacks, which are also referred to false data injection attacks). This paper provides a general framework that formalizes the underlying connection between state estimation and bad data detection routines. We aim to carry out the combined tasks of detecting the presence of random and structured bad data, and form accurate estimations for the state of power grid. This paper characterizes the optimal detectors and estimators. Furthermore, the gains with respect to the existing state estimators and bad data detectors are established through numerical evaluations.
topic State estimation
Power system security
Bad data detection
Data injection attack
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8952865/
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