Estrutura de Capital e Remuneração dos Funcionários: Evidência Empírica no Brasil

This paper analyzes whether the higher the company’s financial leverage, the higher the salaries demanded by staff for the embedded financial distress risk. By applying Berk, Stanton and Zechner’s (2010) model, we use a 2SLS for a sample of 250 non-financial companies listed on BOVESPA from 2007 t...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Duk Young Choi, Richard Saito, Vinicius Augusto Brunassi Silva
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação e Pesquisa em Administração (ANPAD) 2015-03-01
Series:RAC: Revista de Administração Contemporânea
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.anpad.org.br/periodicos/arq_pdf/a_1565.pdf
Description
Summary:This paper analyzes whether the higher the company’s financial leverage, the higher the salaries demanded by staff for the embedded financial distress risk. By applying Berk, Stanton and Zechner’s (2010) model, we use a 2SLS for a sample of 250 non-financial companies listed on BOVESPA from 2007 to 2009. Indeed, we find that for each additional 1% of financial leverage, the staff remunerations increase by 0.26%, controlling for Chief Executive Officer (CEO) profile.
ISSN:1415-6555
1982-7849