Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal
Despite long-standing debate about the challenges of establishing command and control of India’s nuclear weapons, few details about the structure and organization of such a system exist in the public domain. Objectives for effective command and control have been laid out in India’s Draft Nuclear Doc...
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Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1760021 |
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doaj-95b272c302b24b97bdc20099a11717752020-11-25T03:37:53ZengTaylor & Francis GroupJournal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament2575-16542020-01-013112010.1080/25751654.2020.17600211760021Command and Control of India’s Nuclear ArsenalLauren J. Borja0M.V. Ramana1Stanford UniversityUniversity of British ColumbiaDespite long-standing debate about the challenges of establishing command and control of India’s nuclear weapons, few details about the structure and organization of such a system exist in the public domain. Objectives for effective command and control have been laid out in India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999, which was followed by the more official statement from 2003 that described some of the organizations governing the new arsenal. It is now almost twenty years later, and many changes have occurred within Indian nuclear force structure. This article documents these evolutions and details some of the similarities and differences between how nuclear weapons might be controlled in India as compared to states that developed nuclear weapons earlier. It specifically examines some of the relevant infrastructure and capabilities, such as military command centres, satellites, and delivery vehicles, that have been developed in the last two decades that are important to nuclear command and control. This article also identifies continuing challenges, such as risks due to the entanglement of conventional and civilian infrastructure with nuclear systems, associated with command and control of nuclear weapons in India.http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1760021command and controlnuclear weaponsindianuclear threatsunauthorized usenuclear infrastructure and capabilities |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Lauren J. Borja M.V. Ramana |
spellingShingle |
Lauren J. Borja M.V. Ramana Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament command and control nuclear weapons india nuclear threats unauthorized use nuclear infrastructure and capabilities |
author_facet |
Lauren J. Borja M.V. Ramana |
author_sort |
Lauren J. Borja |
title |
Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal |
title_short |
Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal |
title_full |
Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal |
title_fullStr |
Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal |
title_full_unstemmed |
Command and Control of India’s Nuclear Arsenal |
title_sort |
command and control of india’s nuclear arsenal |
publisher |
Taylor & Francis Group |
series |
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament |
issn |
2575-1654 |
publishDate |
2020-01-01 |
description |
Despite long-standing debate about the challenges of establishing command and control of India’s nuclear weapons, few details about the structure and organization of such a system exist in the public domain. Objectives for effective command and control have been laid out in India’s Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999, which was followed by the more official statement from 2003 that described some of the organizations governing the new arsenal. It is now almost twenty years later, and many changes have occurred within Indian nuclear force structure. This article documents these evolutions and details some of the similarities and differences between how nuclear weapons might be controlled in India as compared to states that developed nuclear weapons earlier. It specifically examines some of the relevant infrastructure and capabilities, such as military command centres, satellites, and delivery vehicles, that have been developed in the last two decades that are important to nuclear command and control. This article also identifies continuing challenges, such as risks due to the entanglement of conventional and civilian infrastructure with nuclear systems, associated with command and control of nuclear weapons in India. |
topic |
command and control nuclear weapons india nuclear threats unauthorized use nuclear infrastructure and capabilities |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1760021 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT laurenjborja commandandcontrolofindiasnucleararsenal AT mvramana commandandcontrolofindiasnucleararsenal |
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