Financial claims and product market competition: An explanation for permitting banks to hold equity in firms
This paper examines financial claims for lending if banks are permitted to hold equity in productive firms. We demonstrate that in situations where an oligopolistic product market has relatively high competition, e.g., quasi-competitive behavior, equity holding by banks is likely to do little damage...
Main Authors: | Pao Shin-Heng, Lin Jyh-Horng |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Belgrade
2008-01-01
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Series: | Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0354-0243/2008/0354-02430802235P.pdf |
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