As crenças naturais e a mitigação do ceticismo em Hume
This article intends to show that Hume ideas theory doesn’t express properly a sceptical solution for the beliefs justification problem, but, above all, a naturalist solution. An empiricist investigation like Hume’s gives priority to the sensitive impressions in the cognitive process of human nature...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
2010-06-01
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| Series: | Princípios |
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| Online Access: | http://www.principios.cchla.ufrn.br/27P-203-218.pdf |
| Summary: | This article intends to show that Hume ideas theory doesn’t express properly a sceptical solution for the beliefs justification problem, but, above all, a naturalist solution. An empiricist investigation like Hume’s gives priority to the sensitive impressions in the cognitive process of human nature while he admits the difficulties in eliciting ideas directly from the impressions, which may cause the doubt and the suspension of beliefs. To mitigate scepticism, only a therapeutic intervention is possible, in order to describe natural beliefs more than its suspension due to a lack of a rational basis. |
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| ISSN: | 0104-8694 1983-2109 |