Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.

An explanation for the political processes leading to the sudden collapse of empires and states would be useful for understanding both historical and contemporary political events. We examine political disintegration across eras, cultures and geographical scale to form a simple hypothesis that can b...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Daniel John Lawson, Neeraj Oak
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2014-01-01
Series:PLoS ONE
Online Access:http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4014536?pdf=render
id doaj-91f31ebbdc45426983e9f130055dcb7a
record_format Article
spelling doaj-91f31ebbdc45426983e9f130055dcb7a2020-11-25T02:31:46ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032014-01-0195e9652310.1371/journal.pone.0096523Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.Daniel John LawsonNeeraj OakAn explanation for the political processes leading to the sudden collapse of empires and states would be useful for understanding both historical and contemporary political events. We examine political disintegration across eras, cultures and geographical scale to form a simple hypothesis that can be expressed verbally yet formulated mathematically. Factions within a state make choices described by game-theory about whether to accept the political status quo, or to attempt to better their circumstances through costly rebellion. In lieu of precise data we verify our model using sensitivity analysis. We find that a small amount of dissatisfaction is typically harmless to the state, but can trigger sudden collapse when there is a sufficient buildup of political inequality. Contrary to intuition, a state is predicted to be least stable when its leadership is at the height of its political power and thus most able to exert its influence through external warfare, lavish expense or autocratic decree.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4014536?pdf=render
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Daniel John Lawson
Neeraj Oak
spellingShingle Daniel John Lawson
Neeraj Oak
Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
PLoS ONE
author_facet Daniel John Lawson
Neeraj Oak
author_sort Daniel John Lawson
title Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
title_short Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
title_full Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
title_fullStr Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
title_full_unstemmed Apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
title_sort apparent strength conceals instability in a model for the collapse of historical states.
publisher Public Library of Science (PLoS)
series PLoS ONE
issn 1932-6203
publishDate 2014-01-01
description An explanation for the political processes leading to the sudden collapse of empires and states would be useful for understanding both historical and contemporary political events. We examine political disintegration across eras, cultures and geographical scale to form a simple hypothesis that can be expressed verbally yet formulated mathematically. Factions within a state make choices described by game-theory about whether to accept the political status quo, or to attempt to better their circumstances through costly rebellion. In lieu of precise data we verify our model using sensitivity analysis. We find that a small amount of dissatisfaction is typically harmless to the state, but can trigger sudden collapse when there is a sufficient buildup of political inequality. Contrary to intuition, a state is predicted to be least stable when its leadership is at the height of its political power and thus most able to exert its influence through external warfare, lavish expense or autocratic decree.
url http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC4014536?pdf=render
work_keys_str_mv AT danieljohnlawson apparentstrengthconcealsinstabilityinamodelforthecollapseofhistoricalstates
AT neerajoak apparentstrengthconcealsinstabilityinamodelforthecollapseofhistoricalstates
_version_ 1724822126804860928