Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market

This research discusses about the roles of institutional ownership and leverage as control mechanism over agency conflict and how it affects corporate performance. Agency conflict is a result of expropriation via tunneling on asset utilization. This study uses panel data with a sample of 136 compa...

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Main Authors: Christian Herdinata, Eduardus Tandelilin, Hermeindito
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Prasetiya Mulya Publishing 2013-04-01
Series:International Research Journal of Business Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:http://irjbs.com/index.php/jurnalirjbs/article/view/931
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spelling doaj-8ef6deda53ed4e8eba19ef0f5bddadf12020-11-24T21:25:17ZengPrasetiya Mulya PublishingInternational Research Journal of Business Studies2089-62712338-45652013-04-0161456210.21632/irjbs.6.1.45-62 86Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital MarketChristian Herdinata0Eduardus Tandelilin1Hermeindito2 Universitas Katolik Widya Mandala Surabaya, IndonesiaUniversitas Gadjah Mada, IndonesiaUniversitas Katolik Widya Mandala Surabaya, IndonesiaThis research discusses about the roles of institutional ownership and leverage as control mechanism over agency conflict and how it affects corporate performance. Agency conflict is a result of expropriation via tunneling on asset utilization. This study uses panel data with a sample of 136 companies in Indonesia between 2001-2012. Simultaneous model testing using Three Stage Least Square estimation technique is also used in this study. Results suggest that institutional ownership and leverage have a non-linear effect on asset utilization. Institutional ownership can be used as a control mechanism at higher levels of ownership. However, when the ownership surpasses certain level, institutional owners will be able to conduct expropriation through tunneling. Low-level leverage will result in expropriation through tunneling by institutional owners. On the other hand, higher level of leverage makes it possible to use leverage as control mechanism. This study also suggests that there is a substitutional correlation between the implementation of control mechanism and leverage. This research also proves that the effect of control mechanism on asset utilization will improve corporate performance. This research does not specifically investigate the proportions of institutional ownership and leverage as borderline threshold which shows that the two variables can be used as control mechanism. It also implies that the control mechanism over agency conflict which happens as a result of expropriation through tunneling can be done using institutional ownership and leverage. Institutional ownership and leverage must, in this case, be conducted properly to-wards asset utilization so that it can improve corporate performance. This research provides evidence and solutions for agency conflicts that happen as a result of expropriation through tunneling. This study also contributes to the agency theory testing model by using simultaneous equation and considering non-linear testing method. http://irjbs.com/index.php/jurnalirjbs/article/view/931institutional ownershipleverageasset utilizationcorporate performancetunneling
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Christian Herdinata
Eduardus Tandelilin
Hermeindito
spellingShingle Christian Herdinata
Eduardus Tandelilin
Hermeindito
Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market
International Research Journal of Business Studies
institutional ownership
leverage
asset utilization
corporate performance
tunneling
author_facet Christian Herdinata
Eduardus Tandelilin
Hermeindito
author_sort Christian Herdinata
title Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market
title_short Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market
title_full Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market
title_fullStr Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market
title_full_unstemmed Control Mechanism and Value of Firm: Empirical Evidence from Indonesia Capital Market
title_sort control mechanism and value of firm: empirical evidence from indonesia capital market
publisher Prasetiya Mulya Publishing
series International Research Journal of Business Studies
issn 2089-6271
2338-4565
publishDate 2013-04-01
description This research discusses about the roles of institutional ownership and leverage as control mechanism over agency conflict and how it affects corporate performance. Agency conflict is a result of expropriation via tunneling on asset utilization. This study uses panel data with a sample of 136 companies in Indonesia between 2001-2012. Simultaneous model testing using Three Stage Least Square estimation technique is also used in this study. Results suggest that institutional ownership and leverage have a non-linear effect on asset utilization. Institutional ownership can be used as a control mechanism at higher levels of ownership. However, when the ownership surpasses certain level, institutional owners will be able to conduct expropriation through tunneling. Low-level leverage will result in expropriation through tunneling by institutional owners. On the other hand, higher level of leverage makes it possible to use leverage as control mechanism. This study also suggests that there is a substitutional correlation between the implementation of control mechanism and leverage. This research also proves that the effect of control mechanism on asset utilization will improve corporate performance. This research does not specifically investigate the proportions of institutional ownership and leverage as borderline threshold which shows that the two variables can be used as control mechanism. It also implies that the control mechanism over agency conflict which happens as a result of expropriation through tunneling can be done using institutional ownership and leverage. Institutional ownership and leverage must, in this case, be conducted properly to-wards asset utilization so that it can improve corporate performance. This research provides evidence and solutions for agency conflicts that happen as a result of expropriation through tunneling. This study also contributes to the agency theory testing model by using simultaneous equation and considering non-linear testing method.
topic institutional ownership
leverage
asset utilization
corporate performance
tunneling
url http://irjbs.com/index.php/jurnalirjbs/article/view/931
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