Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics

The question of cognitive endowment in animals has been fiercely debated in the scientific community during the last couple of decades (for example, in cognitive ethology and behaviourism), and indeed, all throughout the long history of natural philosophy (from Plato and Aristotle, via Descartes, to...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Otto Lehto
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Tartu Press 2009-12-01
Series:Sign Systems Studies
Online Access:https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/15552
id doaj-8ee34a1e130147bb99260fde0cd79c54
record_format Article
spelling doaj-8ee34a1e130147bb99260fde0cd79c542021-04-02T11:30:35ZengUniversity of Tartu PressSign Systems Studies1406-42431736-74092009-12-01373/410.12697/SSS.2009.37.3-4.02Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethicsOtto LehtoThe question of cognitive endowment in animals has been fiercely debated in the scientific community during the last couple of decades (for example, in cognitive ethology and behaviourism), and indeed, all throughout the long history of natural philosophy (from Plato and Aristotle, via Descartes, to Darwin). The scientific quest for an empirical, evolutionary account of the development and emergence of cognition has met with many philosophical objections, blind alleys and epistemological quandaries. I will argue that we are dealing with conflicting philosophical world views as well as conflicting empirical paradigms of research. After looking at some examples from the relevant literature of animal studies to elucidate the nature of the conflicts that arise, I propose, in strict Darwinian orthodoxy, that cognitive endowments in nature are subject to the sort of continuum and gradation that natural selection of fit variant forms tends to generate. Somewhere between the myth of “free” humans and the myth of “behaviourally conditioned” animals lies the reality of animal behaviour and cognition. In the end, I hope to have softened up some of those deep-seated philosophical problems (and many quasi-problems) that puzzle and dazzle laymen, scientists and philosophers alike in their quest for knowledge about the natural world.https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/15552
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Otto Lehto
spellingShingle Otto Lehto
Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics
Sign Systems Studies
author_facet Otto Lehto
author_sort Otto Lehto
title Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics
title_short Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics
title_full Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics
title_fullStr Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics
title_full_unstemmed Studying the cognitive states of animals: Epistemology, ethology and ethics
title_sort studying the cognitive states of animals: epistemology, ethology and ethics
publisher University of Tartu Press
series Sign Systems Studies
issn 1406-4243
1736-7409
publishDate 2009-12-01
description The question of cognitive endowment in animals has been fiercely debated in the scientific community during the last couple of decades (for example, in cognitive ethology and behaviourism), and indeed, all throughout the long history of natural philosophy (from Plato and Aristotle, via Descartes, to Darwin). The scientific quest for an empirical, evolutionary account of the development and emergence of cognition has met with many philosophical objections, blind alleys and epistemological quandaries. I will argue that we are dealing with conflicting philosophical world views as well as conflicting empirical paradigms of research. After looking at some examples from the relevant literature of animal studies to elucidate the nature of the conflicts that arise, I propose, in strict Darwinian orthodoxy, that cognitive endowments in nature are subject to the sort of continuum and gradation that natural selection of fit variant forms tends to generate. Somewhere between the myth of “free” humans and the myth of “behaviourally conditioned” animals lies the reality of animal behaviour and cognition. In the end, I hope to have softened up some of those deep-seated philosophical problems (and many quasi-problems) that puzzle and dazzle laymen, scientists and philosophers alike in their quest for knowledge about the natural world.
url https://ojs.utlib.ee/index.php/sss/article/view/15552
work_keys_str_mv AT ottolehto studyingthecognitivestatesofanimalsepistemologyethologyandethics
_version_ 1724164604140978176