Stability of generally efficient situation in finite cooperative games with parametric optimality principle ("from Pareto to Nash")
A parametric optimality principle (choice function) in a finite cooperative game of several persons is determined. This principle is specified by means of partition of players set into coalitions. It generates a set of generally efficient situations. Extreme cases of such a partition correspond to P...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science of the Academy of Sciences of Moldova
2003-11-01
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| Series: | Computer Science Journal of Moldova |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.math.md/files/csjm/v11-n3/v11-n3-(pp316-323).pdf |
| Summary: | A parametric optimality principle (choice function) in a finite cooperative game of several persons is determined. This principle is specified by means of partition of players set into coalitions. It generates a set of generally efficient situations. Extreme cases of such a partition correspond to Pareto optimal situation and Nash equilibrium situation. For a situation, efficient for a given partition, analysis of stability to independent perturbations of coefficients of linear payoff functions has been carried out. Extreme levels of perturbations that remain efficient are specified. MSC : 90C29, 90C31 |
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| ISSN: | 1561-4042 |