HOW THE PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC EQUALITY INTRODUCES SUBSTANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURALISM
In discussions on democratic legitimacy, Christiano’s position is often characterized as a monistic position, i.e. a strong and persuasive version of fair deliberative proceduralism. Democracy is thus seen as a realization of public equality in collective decision-making. The presented case for demo...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb, Croatia
2015-01-01
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| Series: | Anali Hrvatskog Politološkog Društva |
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| Online Access: | http://hrcak.srce.hr/file/237238 |
| Summary: | In discussions on democratic legitimacy, Christiano’s position is often characterized as a monistic position, i.e. a strong and persuasive version of fair deliberative proceduralism. Democracy is thus seen as a realization of public equality in collective decision-making. The presented case for democracy is non-instrumental, and the quality of outcomes produced by a democratic decision-making process does not constitute or in any way influence the legitimacy – generating features of that decision-making process. I argue that the quality of political decisions produced by a democratic decision-making process should play an important (though not decisive) role in Christiano’s argument. Consequently, I claim that his case for democracy should be (at least somewhat) instrumental. I consider four cases from Christiano’s The Constitution of Equality that show how outcomes of democratic procedures are very important to Christiano. Furthermore, I argue that these outcomes are so important that, when deciding between two or more fair decision-making procedures, one that produces the best outcomes should be considered legitimate. |
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| ISSN: | 1845-6707 1847-5299 |