Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers

Basel III, regulating the solvency of banks, is to be fully implemented by 2027 while Solvency III directed at insurers is being prepared. In view of past experience, it will be closely modelled after Basel III. This raises two questions. (i) Will Basel III and Solvency III be more successful than t...

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Main Author: Peter Zweifel
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2021-06-01
Series:Journal of Risk and Financial Management
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/1911-8074/14/6/258
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spelling doaj-8ce68f5119ff41dd9e383f83a5d89dcf2021-06-30T23:36:08ZengMDPI AGJournal of Risk and Financial Management1911-80661911-80742021-06-011425825810.3390/jrfm14060258Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for InsurersPeter Zweifel0Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Rämistrasse 71, 8006 Zürich, SwitzerlandBasel III, regulating the solvency of banks, is to be fully implemented by 2027 while Solvency III directed at insurers is being prepared. In view of past experience, it will be closely modelled after Basel III. This raises two questions. (i) Will Basel III and Solvency III be more successful than their predecessors? (ii) Is it appropriate to continue regulating the solvency of banks and insurers in the same way? The first question is motivated by an earlier finding that Basel I and II risked inducing more rather than less risk-taking by banks, which also holds for Solvency I and II w.r.t. insurers. The methodology applied was to determine the slope of an endogenous perceived efficiency frontier (EPEF) in (<inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mover accent="true"><mi>μ</mi><mo>^</mo></mover><mo>,</mo><mover accent="true"><mi>σ</mi><mo>^</mo></mover></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula>)-space derived from banks’ and insurers’ optimal adjustment to exogenous changes, in expected returns <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mi>d</mi><mover accent="true"><mi>μ</mi><mo>¯</mo></mover></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula> and volatility <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mi>d</mi><mover accent="true"><mi>σ</mi><mo>¯</mo></mover></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula> on the capital market. Both Basel I and II and Solvency I and II neglected the impact of these developments on banks’ and insurers’ EPEF. This neglect had the effect of steepening the EPEF, causing senior management to opt for an increased rather than reduced value of <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mover accent="true"><mi>σ</mi><mo>^</mo></mover></semantics></math></inline-formula>, and hence a lower solvency level. This issue is resolved by Basel III (Principle 5), which requires banks to take developments in the capital market into account in the formulation of their business strategies designed to ensure solvency. In combination with increased capital requirements, this is shown to result in a reduced slope of their EPEF and hence a reduced risk exposure. However, planned Solvency III may cause the EPEF of highly capitalized insurance companies to become steeper, with a concomitant decrease in their risk-taking and an increase of their solvency level. The second question, concerning the appropriateness of the uniformity of solvency regulation directed at banks and insurers, arises because the parameters determining the slope of the respective EPEF are found to crucially differ. Therefore, the uniformity of Basel and Solvency norms creates the risk of a mistaken regulatory focus.https://www.mdpi.com/1911-8074/14/6/258regulationbanksinsurersBasel IBasel IIBasel III
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Peter Zweifel
spellingShingle Peter Zweifel
Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers
Journal of Risk and Financial Management
regulation
banks
insurers
Basel I
Basel II
Basel III
author_facet Peter Zweifel
author_sort Peter Zweifel
title Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers
title_short Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers
title_full Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers
title_fullStr Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers
title_full_unstemmed Solvency Regulation—An Assessment of Basel III for Banks and of Planned Solvency III for Insurers
title_sort solvency regulation—an assessment of basel iii for banks and of planned solvency iii for insurers
publisher MDPI AG
series Journal of Risk and Financial Management
issn 1911-8066
1911-8074
publishDate 2021-06-01
description Basel III, regulating the solvency of banks, is to be fully implemented by 2027 while Solvency III directed at insurers is being prepared. In view of past experience, it will be closely modelled after Basel III. This raises two questions. (i) Will Basel III and Solvency III be more successful than their predecessors? (ii) Is it appropriate to continue regulating the solvency of banks and insurers in the same way? The first question is motivated by an earlier finding that Basel I and II risked inducing more rather than less risk-taking by banks, which also holds for Solvency I and II w.r.t. insurers. The methodology applied was to determine the slope of an endogenous perceived efficiency frontier (EPEF) in (<inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mover accent="true"><mi>μ</mi><mo>^</mo></mover><mo>,</mo><mover accent="true"><mi>σ</mi><mo>^</mo></mover></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula>)-space derived from banks’ and insurers’ optimal adjustment to exogenous changes, in expected returns <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mi>d</mi><mover accent="true"><mi>μ</mi><mo>¯</mo></mover></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula> and volatility <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mrow><mi>d</mi><mover accent="true"><mi>σ</mi><mo>¯</mo></mover></mrow></semantics></math></inline-formula> on the capital market. Both Basel I and II and Solvency I and II neglected the impact of these developments on banks’ and insurers’ EPEF. This neglect had the effect of steepening the EPEF, causing senior management to opt for an increased rather than reduced value of <inline-formula><math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" display="inline"><semantics><mover accent="true"><mi>σ</mi><mo>^</mo></mover></semantics></math></inline-formula>, and hence a lower solvency level. This issue is resolved by Basel III (Principle 5), which requires banks to take developments in the capital market into account in the formulation of their business strategies designed to ensure solvency. In combination with increased capital requirements, this is shown to result in a reduced slope of their EPEF and hence a reduced risk exposure. However, planned Solvency III may cause the EPEF of highly capitalized insurance companies to become steeper, with a concomitant decrease in their risk-taking and an increase of their solvency level. The second question, concerning the appropriateness of the uniformity of solvency regulation directed at banks and insurers, arises because the parameters determining the slope of the respective EPEF are found to crucially differ. Therefore, the uniformity of Basel and Solvency norms creates the risk of a mistaken regulatory focus.
topic regulation
banks
insurers
Basel I
Basel II
Basel III
url https://www.mdpi.com/1911-8074/14/6/258
work_keys_str_mv AT peterzweifel solvencyregulationanassessmentofbaseliiiforbanksandofplannedsolvencyiiiforinsurers
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