State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games

This paper investigates solution concepts for coalitional games. Several solution concepts are characterized, such as the core, Shapley value, bargaining set, stable set, nucleolus, and kernel. We look at recent developments of succinct representations of coalitional games, such as weighted voting g...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Simina Branzei
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: EduSoft publishing 2010-04-01
Series:Brain: Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience
Online Access:http://brain.edusoft.ro/index.php/brain/article/view/41
id doaj-8c4a6f35574f468593f4acd9c91c5917
record_format Article
spelling doaj-8c4a6f35574f468593f4acd9c91c59172020-11-24T20:49:22ZengEduSoft publishingBrain: Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience2067-39572010-04-011289101State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional GamesSimina BranzeiThis paper investigates solution concepts for coalitional games. Several solution concepts are characterized, such as the core, Shapley value, bargaining set, stable set, nucleolus, and kernel. We look at recent developments of succinct representations of coalitional games, such as weighted voting games, coalitional resource games, cooperative boolean games, and marginal contribution nets. Existing solution concepts have prohibitive complexity requirements even for very simple classes of games. We discuss an agenda for finding an equilibrium solution concept that is as appealing as the core, but that is tractable and guaranteed to exist.http://brain.edusoft.ro/index.php/brain/article/view/41
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Simina Branzei
spellingShingle Simina Branzei
State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games
Brain: Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience
author_facet Simina Branzei
author_sort Simina Branzei
title State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games
title_short State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games
title_full State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games
title_fullStr State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games
title_full_unstemmed State of the Art: Solution Concepts for Coalitional Games
title_sort state of the art: solution concepts for coalitional games
publisher EduSoft publishing
series Brain: Broad Research in Artificial Intelligence and Neuroscience
issn 2067-3957
publishDate 2010-04-01
description This paper investigates solution concepts for coalitional games. Several solution concepts are characterized, such as the core, Shapley value, bargaining set, stable set, nucleolus, and kernel. We look at recent developments of succinct representations of coalitional games, such as weighted voting games, coalitional resource games, cooperative boolean games, and marginal contribution nets. Existing solution concepts have prohibitive complexity requirements even for very simple classes of games. We discuss an agenda for finding an equilibrium solution concept that is as appealing as the core, but that is tractable and guaranteed to exist.
url http://brain.edusoft.ro/index.php/brain/article/view/41
work_keys_str_mv AT siminabranzei stateoftheartsolutionconceptsforcoalitionalgames
_version_ 1716805926230425600