Some Strands of Wittgenstein’s Normative Pragmatism, and Some Strains of his Semantic Nihilism

• Main Author: Robert B. Brandom
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Disputatio Editions-IAR 2019-06-01
• Series: Disputatio
• Subjects: Meaning and Use; Hypothetical Entitites; Antiscientism; Semantic Nihilism; Linguistic Dynamism
• Online Access: https://studiahumanitatis.eu/ojs/index.php/disputatio/article/view/78

In this reflection I address one of the critical questions this monograph is about: How to justify proposing yet another semantic theory in the light of Wittgenstein’s strong warnings against it. I see two clear motives for Wittgenstein’s semantic nihilism. The first one is the view that philosophical problems arise from postulating hypothetical entities such as “meanings”. To dissolve the philosophical problems rather than create new ones, Wittgenstein suggests substituting “meaning” with “use” and avoiding scientism in philosophy together with the urge to penetrate in one's investigation to unobservable depths. I believe this first motive constitutes only a weak motive for Wittgenstein’s quietism, because there are substantial differences between empirical theories in natural sciences and semantic theories in philosophy that leave Wittgenstein’s assimilation of both open to criticism. But Wittgenstein is right, on the second motive, that given the dynamic character of linguistic practice, the classical project of semantic theory is a disease that can be removed or ameliorated only by heeding the advice to replace concern with meaning by concern with use. On my view, this does not preclude, however, a different kind of theoretical approach to meaning that avoids the pitfalls of the Procrustean enterprise Wittgenstein complained about.