“See, Its Eye is Fixed on It”: Anscombe and Wittgenstein on Animals and Intention
Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Ludwig Wittgenstein for talking about the “natural expression of an intention” in his Philosophical Investigations. I consider recent responses to this dispute, especially those by Richard Moran and Martin Stone (writing together) and by Martin Gustafsson. Moran and Sto...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Catalan |
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Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament de Filosofia
2020-03-01
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| Series: | Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofia |
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| Online Access: | https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/1274 |
| Summary: | Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Ludwig Wittgenstein for talking about the “natural expression of an intention” in his Philosophical Investigations. I consider recent responses to this dispute, especially those by Richard Moran and Martin Stone (writing together) and by Martin Gustafsson. Moran and Stone explain why Anscombe rejects talk of non-human animals expressing intention, but emphasize the importance of language so much that it becomes hard to see on what basis intentions can ever be non-arbitrarily attributed to animals. Gustafsson notices this problem, and offers a solution based on biology and, in particular, knowledge of what is and is not conducive to the flourishing of members of each species. However, this goes beyond what Anscombe says, and introduces other problems. I propose that we can sometimes simply see what an individual intends to do by observing its behavior, without reference to what is good or bad for members of its species. This is true to what Anscombe says and appears to avoid the problems faced by the other views considered. |
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| ISSN: | 0211-402X 2014-881X |