The Contingency of Physical Laws
The purpose of this paper is to explain the sense in which laws of physics are contingent. It argues, first, that contemporary Humean accounts cannot adequately explain the contingency of physical laws; and second, that Hume’s own arguments against the metaphysical necessity of causal connections ar...
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
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doaj-874b288dc8e3493faa6eebb82b9095332020-11-25T02:28:12ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112019-12-0123348750210.5007/1808-1711.2019v23n3p48733889The Contingency of Physical LawsFerenc Huoranszki0Philosophy Department Central European University BudapestThe purpose of this paper is to explain the sense in which laws of physics are contingent. It argues, first, that contemporary Humean accounts cannot adequately explain the contingency of physical laws; and second, that Hume’s own arguments against the metaphysical necessity of causal connections are not applicable in this context. The paper concludes by arguing that contingency is an essentially emergent, macroscopic phenomenon: we can understand the contingency of fundamental physical laws only through their relation to the distribution of macroscopic modal properties in the manifest world.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70058physical lawsnatural propertiesdispositionscontingencyfundamentality |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Ferenc Huoranszki |
spellingShingle |
Ferenc Huoranszki The Contingency of Physical Laws Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology physical laws natural properties dispositions contingency fundamentality |
author_facet |
Ferenc Huoranszki |
author_sort |
Ferenc Huoranszki |
title |
The Contingency of Physical Laws |
title_short |
The Contingency of Physical Laws |
title_full |
The Contingency of Physical Laws |
title_fullStr |
The Contingency of Physical Laws |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Contingency of Physical Laws |
title_sort |
contingency of physical laws |
publisher |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
series |
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
issn |
1414-4247 1808-1711 |
publishDate |
2019-12-01 |
description |
The purpose of this paper is to explain the sense in which laws of physics are contingent. It argues, first, that contemporary Humean accounts cannot adequately explain the contingency of physical laws; and second, that Hume’s own arguments against the metaphysical necessity of causal connections are not applicable in this context. The paper concludes by arguing that contingency is an essentially emergent, macroscopic phenomenon: we can understand the contingency of fundamental physical laws only through their relation to the distribution of macroscopic modal properties in the manifest world. |
topic |
physical laws natural properties dispositions contingency fundamentality |
url |
https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70058 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT ferenchuoranszki thecontingencyofphysicallaws AT ferenchuoranszki contingencyofphysicallaws |
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1724839709431037952 |