Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion

Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD)...

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Main Authors: Manfred Milinski, Christian Hilbe, Dirk Semmann, Ralf Sommerfeld, Jochem Marotzke
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Publishing Group 2016-03-01
Series:Nature Communications
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915
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spelling doaj-85149ede06b944baa92958a9014b283a2021-05-11T10:48:10ZengNature Publishing GroupNature Communications2041-17232016-03-01711910.1038/ncomms10915Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortionManfred Milinski0Christian Hilbe1Dirk Semmann2Ralf Sommerfeld3Jochem Marotzke4Department of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, GermanyDepartment of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Department of Mathematics, Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard UniversityDepartment of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, GermanyDepartment of Evolutionary Ecology, Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Strasse 2, 24306 Plön, GermanyDepartment “The Ocean in the Earth System”, Max Planck Institute for MeteorologySocial dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies.https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Manfred Milinski
Christian Hilbe
Dirk Semmann
Ralf Sommerfeld
Jochem Marotzke
spellingShingle Manfred Milinski
Christian Hilbe
Dirk Semmann
Ralf Sommerfeld
Jochem Marotzke
Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Nature Communications
author_facet Manfred Milinski
Christian Hilbe
Dirk Semmann
Ralf Sommerfeld
Jochem Marotzke
author_sort Manfred Milinski
title Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_short Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_full Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_fullStr Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_full_unstemmed Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
title_sort humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
publisher Nature Publishing Group
series Nature Communications
issn 2041-1723
publishDate 2016-03-01
description Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies.
url https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915
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