Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD)...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Nature Publishing Group
2016-03-01
|
| Series: | Nature Communications |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms10915 |
| Summary: | Social dilemmas force players to balance between personal and collective gain. Here, inspired by the negotiations for greenhouse-gas emission limitations, the authors experimentally studied a representative-based collective-risk scenario, reporting the emergence of extortionate zero-determinant (ZD) strategies. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2041-1723 |