Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic

Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions...

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Main Author: Thomas Hofweber
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: New Prairie Press 2010-11-01
Series:The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283
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spelling doaj-8485f1ffbc9d4ee79bb4e5e0db7834352021-06-30T19:33:16ZengNew Prairie PressThe Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication1944-36762010-11-01510.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive LogicThomas HofweberAlthough there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely tied to two conceptions of deductive logic, and it is the key, I argue, for understanding first the connection between meaning and inferential role, and second what the paradoxes show more generally. http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Thomas Hofweber
spellingShingle Thomas Hofweber
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
author_facet Thomas Hofweber
author_sort Thomas Hofweber
title Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
title_short Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
title_full Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
title_fullStr Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
title_full_unstemmed Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
title_sort inferential role and the ideal of deductive logic
publisher New Prairie Press
series The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication
issn 1944-3676
publishDate 2010-11-01
description Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely tied to two conceptions of deductive logic, and it is the key, I argue, for understanding first the connection between meaning and inferential role, and second what the paradoxes show more generally.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283
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