Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic
Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions...
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2010-11-01
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Series: | The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication |
Online Access: | http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283 |
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doaj-8485f1ffbc9d4ee79bb4e5e0db7834352021-06-30T19:33:16ZengNew Prairie PressThe Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication1944-36762010-11-01510.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive LogicThomas HofweberAlthough there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely tied to two conceptions of deductive logic, and it is the key, I argue, for understanding first the connection between meaning and inferential role, and second what the paradoxes show more generally. http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283 |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Thomas Hofweber |
spellingShingle |
Thomas Hofweber Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication |
author_facet |
Thomas Hofweber |
author_sort |
Thomas Hofweber |
title |
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic |
title_short |
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic |
title_full |
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic |
title_fullStr |
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic |
title_full_unstemmed |
Inferential Role and the Ideal of Deductive Logic |
title_sort |
inferential role and the ideal of deductive logic |
publisher |
New Prairie Press |
series |
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication |
issn |
1944-3676 |
publishDate |
2010-11-01 |
description |
Although there is a prima facie strong case for a close connection between the meaning and inferential role of certain expressions, this connection seems seriously threatened by the semantic and logical paradoxes which rely on these inferential roles. Some philosophers have drawn radical conclusions from the paradoxes for the theory of meaning in general, and for which sentences in our language are true. I criticize these overreactions, and instead propose to distinguish two conceptions of inferential role. This distinction is closely tied to two conceptions of deductive logic, and it is the key, I argue, for understanding first the connection between meaning and inferential role, and second what the paradoxes show more generally. |
url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.4148/biyclc.v5i0.283 |
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