Descartes’ refutation of the skeptic and the atheist. Three milestones for its meaning and scope

• Main Author: Rodrigo González
• Format: Article
• Language: deu
• Published: Universidad Complutense de Madrid 2017-04-01
• Series: Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía
• Subjects: escepticismo; ateísmo; duda hiperbólica; Dios.
• Online Access: http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/ASHF/article/view/55653

Abstract. in this paper I argue that, despite the so-called Cartesian skepticism, the meaning and scope of Descartes’ refutation of the skeptic and the atheist can be grasped in terms of three metaphysical milestones. In the first section, I examine how the skeptical arguments are used as a means, not as an end. As I stress, the cogito is the point at which the hyperbolic doubt must be stopped. Then, in the second section, I discuss why Descartes counters fideism. Given the fact that this view is related to skepticism, and to the impossibility to prove God’s existence, Descartes proves His existence. I hold, in the final section, that God guarantees epistemological certainty, even of clear and distinct ideas, whose reliability is called into question due to the evil genius hypothesis. According to Descartes, then, proving the existence of God is necessary to guarantee infallible knowledge, and the basis for inferring the existence of the external world. The three milestones, then, seem to be sufficient to clarify the meaning and scope of the so-called Cartesian skepticism.