Does Joshua Greene’s Dual Process Theory of Moral Judgment Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy?
In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I hig...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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Universidad Pontificia Comillas
2017-02-01
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| Series: | Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica |
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| Online Access: | https://revistas.upcomillas.es/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/7686 |
| Summary: | In this article I analyse whether Joshua Greene’s dual process theory of moral judgment commits the naturalistic fallacy. Firstly, and against current authors such as Patricia S. Churchland, I uphold the validity of the naturalistic fallacy denounced by Moore for more than a century. Secondly, I highlight and question Greene’s naturalized way of understanding Deontologism. Thirdly, I assert the distinction between "neural basis" and "moral foundation" as the key to avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy. Finally and according to that key distinction I assess Greene’s neuroethical approach and I analyse some of its most critical aspects related to normative issues. |
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| ISSN: | 0031-4749 2386-5822 |