Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées

• Main Author: Christopher Lantenois
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Association Recherche & Régulation 2010-12-01
• Series: Revue de la Régulation
• Subjects: Business Elite; compensation; corporate governance; Germany; in-house career; Institutional Investors
• Online Access: http://journals.openedition.org/regulation/8959

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of the foreign Institutional Investors arrival in the German quoted firms’ capital structure, and the broadcast of the “Shareholder Value” discourse, on the social reproduction process of the German managerial Elites. In this sense, we have assembled a panel of 25 quoted firms. Our study is from 1990 to 2010. Our paper is organized in three parts. First, we will clarify two elements of pressure that the German capitalism has to bear, namely (a) the sudden arrival of the foreign Institutional Investors in the ownership capital structure, and (b) the reform of corporate governance principles. Then, we will estimate their effects on the sociology and the nomination process of the presidents by analyzing their school trail, the “in-house career” pattern, and the gap between the presidency of the management board and the presidency of the supervisory board. We will try to localize the continuities, inertias and changes. In fine, we will focus our attention upon the remuneration problematic. We are in the presence of a complex combination of inertia and change. However, the recent adoption of some market mechanisms doesn’t reveal an abrupt change.