¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos

<p>The excuse that interrogates this writing is to venture - given the conditions imposed by globalization - if a critical hermeneutics of the law is possible, one that places human rights as the primary rule of the whole legal discourse, thus displacing them from their adjacent and instrument...

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Main Author: Asier Martínez de Bringas
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Deusto 2017-12-01
Series:Deusto Journal of Human Rights
Subjects:
Online Access:http://revista-derechoshumanos.revistas.deusto.es/article/view/1145
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spelling doaj-81e174a234994100b63496713e0f52d02020-11-24T21:12:48ZengUniversity of DeustoDeusto Journal of Human Rights2530-42752603-60022017-12-0101152810.18543/aahdh-1-2004pp15-281064¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicosAsier Martínez de Bringas<p>The excuse that interrogates this writing is to venture - given the conditions imposed by globalization - if a critical hermeneutics of the law is possible, one that places human rights as the primary rule of the whole legal discourse, thus displacing them from their adjacent and instrumental condition. We are faced with the proposal to understand human rights as the fundamental moment of all legal epistemology and as a constituent condition of any provision, norm or constituted criterion. The Grundnorm has acquired its status as a fundamental and most hermeneutic promontory, empowered and instilled by a set of framework norms, primary and fundamental criteria of law, which would be identified with what we will call human rights. In order to do so, it will be necessary to listen, in particular, what we mean by rights, since this attempt at pre-normative identification leads us to be able to activate, in this way, a jurisdictional dynamism in the service of the most fractured and inconsistent dignities, solidity. This will provide elements to contain, divert and channel state violence, given the exacerbated taste of this agency for its use and management in monopolistic conditions without options for challenge, complaint or complaint.</p><p><strong>Published online</strong>: 11 December 2017</p>http://revista-derechoshumanos.revistas.deusto.es/article/view/1145derechos humanos“Grundnorm”poderconocimientoepistemología
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Asier Martínez de Bringas
spellingShingle Asier Martínez de Bringas
¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
Deusto Journal of Human Rights
derechos humanos
“Grundnorm”
poder
conocimiento
epistemología
author_facet Asier Martínez de Bringas
author_sort Asier Martínez de Bringas
title ¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
title_short ¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
title_full ¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
title_fullStr ¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
title_full_unstemmed ¿Convencionalismo(s) o Derechos Humanos críticos? Hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
title_sort ¿convencionalismo(s) o derechos humanos críticos? hacia una interpretación resistente de los procesos jurídicos
publisher University of Deusto
series Deusto Journal of Human Rights
issn 2530-4275
2603-6002
publishDate 2017-12-01
description <p>The excuse that interrogates this writing is to venture - given the conditions imposed by globalization - if a critical hermeneutics of the law is possible, one that places human rights as the primary rule of the whole legal discourse, thus displacing them from their adjacent and instrumental condition. We are faced with the proposal to understand human rights as the fundamental moment of all legal epistemology and as a constituent condition of any provision, norm or constituted criterion. The Grundnorm has acquired its status as a fundamental and most hermeneutic promontory, empowered and instilled by a set of framework norms, primary and fundamental criteria of law, which would be identified with what we will call human rights. In order to do so, it will be necessary to listen, in particular, what we mean by rights, since this attempt at pre-normative identification leads us to be able to activate, in this way, a jurisdictional dynamism in the service of the most fractured and inconsistent dignities, solidity. This will provide elements to contain, divert and channel state violence, given the exacerbated taste of this agency for its use and management in monopolistic conditions without options for challenge, complaint or complaint.</p><p><strong>Published online</strong>: 11 December 2017</p>
topic derechos humanos
“Grundnorm”
poder
conocimiento
epistemología
url http://revista-derechoshumanos.revistas.deusto.es/article/view/1145
work_keys_str_mv AT asiermartinezdebringas convencionalismosoderechoshumanoscriticoshaciaunainterpretacionresistentedelosprocesosjuridicos
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