Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions

We contend that it is possible to argue reasonably for and against arguments from classifications and definitions, provided they are seen as defeasible (subject to exceptions and critical questioning). Arguments from classification of the most common sorts are shown to be based on defeasible reasoni...

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Main Authors: Douglas Walton, Fabrizio Macagno
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Windsor 2010-03-01
Series:Informal Logic
Subjects:
Online Access:https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/692
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spelling doaj-7f5707649fea4dc8beffc21e3bb1bdd42020-11-25T01:43:18ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2010-03-0130110.22329/il.v30i1.692Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from DefinitionsDouglas WaltonFabrizio Macagno0Catholic University of MilanWe contend that it is possible to argue reasonably for and against arguments from classifications and definitions, provided they are seen as defeasible (subject to exceptions and critical questioning). Arguments from classification of the most common sorts are shown to be based on defeasible reasoning of various kinds represented by patterns of logical reasoning called defeasible argumentation schemes. We show how such schemes can be identified with heuristics, or short-cut solutions to a problem. We examine a variety of arguments of this sort, including argument from abductive classification, argument from causal classification, argument from analogy-based classification and arguments from classification based on generalizations.https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/692argumentation schemesinferencecommon knowledgeclassifications
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Douglas Walton
Fabrizio Macagno
spellingShingle Douglas Walton
Fabrizio Macagno
Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
Informal Logic
argumentation schemes
inference
common knowledge
classifications
author_facet Douglas Walton
Fabrizio Macagno
author_sort Douglas Walton
title Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
title_short Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
title_full Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
title_fullStr Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
title_full_unstemmed Defeasible Classifications and Inferences from Definitions
title_sort defeasible classifications and inferences from definitions
publisher University of Windsor
series Informal Logic
issn 0824-2577
2293-734X
publishDate 2010-03-01
description We contend that it is possible to argue reasonably for and against arguments from classifications and definitions, provided they are seen as defeasible (subject to exceptions and critical questioning). Arguments from classification of the most common sorts are shown to be based on defeasible reasoning of various kinds represented by patterns of logical reasoning called defeasible argumentation schemes. We show how such schemes can be identified with heuristics, or short-cut solutions to a problem. We examine a variety of arguments of this sort, including argument from abductive classification, argument from causal classification, argument from analogy-based classification and arguments from classification based on generalizations.
topic argumentation schemes
inference
common knowledge
classifications
url https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/692
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