perception, self-correction and philosophical intuition
Abstract. According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, intuitions can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. Phenomenalism, as one of the proposed the...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
| Published: |
University of Isfahan
2016-09-01
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| Series: | Metaphysik |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://mph.ui.ac.ir/article_21459_5201cc0f33dfa0f257cc7f72a010c774.pdf |
| Summary: | Abstract. According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, intuitions can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. Phenomenalism, as one of the proposed theories that aims to explain and argue for justifiedness of intuitions, claims that intuitions are justified because they have a certain phenomenal character: Intuitive contents seem to be true. Furthermore, it argues that sensory perception has similar phenomenal character, in virtue of which it is justified. This analogy confirms the justifiedness of intuitions. In this paper, however, we shall argue that there is at least one another epistemological feature of sensory perception which is relevant to its justifiedness, that is self-correction. Although sensory perception is highly self – correcting, intuitions normally resist self – correction , even in the case of further recalcitrant evidences. The disanalogy threatens phenomenalist analogy for justifiedness of intuitions. |
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| ISSN: | 2008-8086 2476-3276 |