Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia

Macphail’s “null hypothesis,” that there are no differences in intelligence, qualitative, or quantitative, between non-human vertebrates has been controversial. This controversy can be useful if it encourages interest in acquiring a detailed understanding of how non-human animals express flexible pr...

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Main Authors: Fiona R. Cross, Georgina E. Carvell, Robert R. Jackson, Randolph C. Grace
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2020-10-01
Series:Frontiers in Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568049/full
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spelling doaj-7f14daf9c22b4c1eb9f6aaa002ca40f22020-11-25T02:46:28ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782020-10-011110.3389/fpsyg.2020.568049568049Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for PortiaFiona R. Cross0Fiona R. Cross1Georgina E. Carvell2Robert R. Jackson3Robert R. Jackson4Randolph C. Grace5School of Biological Sciences, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New ZealandInternational Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology, Mbita Point, KenyaSchool of Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New ZealandSchool of Biological Sciences, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New ZealandInternational Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology, Mbita Point, KenyaSchool of Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New ZealandMacphail’s “null hypothesis,” that there are no differences in intelligence, qualitative, or quantitative, between non-human vertebrates has been controversial. This controversy can be useful if it encourages interest in acquiring a detailed understanding of how non-human animals express flexible problem-solving capacity (“intelligence”), but limiting the discussion to vertebrates is too arbitrary. As an example, we focus here on Portia, a spider with an especially intricate predatory strategy and a preference for other spiders as prey. We review research on pre-planned detours, expectancy violation, and a capacity to solve confinement problems where, in each of these three contexts, there is experimental evidence of innate cognitive capacities and reliance on internal representation. These cognitive capacities are related to, but not identical to, intelligence. When discussing intelligence, as when discussing cognition, it is more useful to envisage a continuum instead of something that is simply present or not; in other words, a continuum pertaining to flexible problem-solving capacity for “intelligence” and a continuum pertaining to reliance on internal representation for “cognition.” When envisaging a continuum pertaining to intelligence, Daniel Dennett’s notion of four Creatures (Darwinian, Skinnerian, Popperian, and Gregorian) is of interest, with the distinction between Skinnerian and Popperian Creatures being especially relevant when considering Portia. When we consider these distinctions, a case can be made for Portia being a Popperian Creature. Like Skinnerian Creatures, Popperian Creatures express flexible problem solving capacity, but the manner in which this capacity is expressed by Popperian Creatures is more distinctively cognitive.https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568049/fullarthropodcognitionintelligenceproblem solvingrepresentationspider
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
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author Fiona R. Cross
Fiona R. Cross
Georgina E. Carvell
Robert R. Jackson
Robert R. Jackson
Randolph C. Grace
spellingShingle Fiona R. Cross
Fiona R. Cross
Georgina E. Carvell
Robert R. Jackson
Robert R. Jackson
Randolph C. Grace
Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
Frontiers in Psychology
arthropod
cognition
intelligence
problem solving
representation
spider
author_facet Fiona R. Cross
Fiona R. Cross
Georgina E. Carvell
Robert R. Jackson
Robert R. Jackson
Randolph C. Grace
author_sort Fiona R. Cross
title Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
title_short Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
title_full Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
title_fullStr Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
title_full_unstemmed Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia
title_sort arthropod intelligence? the case for portia
publisher Frontiers Media S.A.
series Frontiers in Psychology
issn 1664-1078
publishDate 2020-10-01
description Macphail’s “null hypothesis,” that there are no differences in intelligence, qualitative, or quantitative, between non-human vertebrates has been controversial. This controversy can be useful if it encourages interest in acquiring a detailed understanding of how non-human animals express flexible problem-solving capacity (“intelligence”), but limiting the discussion to vertebrates is too arbitrary. As an example, we focus here on Portia, a spider with an especially intricate predatory strategy and a preference for other spiders as prey. We review research on pre-planned detours, expectancy violation, and a capacity to solve confinement problems where, in each of these three contexts, there is experimental evidence of innate cognitive capacities and reliance on internal representation. These cognitive capacities are related to, but not identical to, intelligence. When discussing intelligence, as when discussing cognition, it is more useful to envisage a continuum instead of something that is simply present or not; in other words, a continuum pertaining to flexible problem-solving capacity for “intelligence” and a continuum pertaining to reliance on internal representation for “cognition.” When envisaging a continuum pertaining to intelligence, Daniel Dennett’s notion of four Creatures (Darwinian, Skinnerian, Popperian, and Gregorian) is of interest, with the distinction between Skinnerian and Popperian Creatures being especially relevant when considering Portia. When we consider these distinctions, a case can be made for Portia being a Popperian Creature. Like Skinnerian Creatures, Popperian Creatures express flexible problem solving capacity, but the manner in which this capacity is expressed by Popperian Creatures is more distinctively cognitive.
topic arthropod
cognition
intelligence
problem solving
representation
spider
url https://www.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.568049/full
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