World and mind, information and semantic content
Many times, the notion of information is used in such a way that the following two theses are suggested: 1) that the world might be no more than information, and 2) that our minds might be no more that information. This paper rejects both theses. In relation to that, I will argue for the need to tak...
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doaj-7cdcf695c8c04aed9762723597008f2f2020-11-25T01:14:58ZengtripleCtripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique1726-670X1726-670X2009-11-017232734310.31269/triplec.v7i2.101101World and mind, information and semantic contentAntonio Manuel Liz0University of La LagunaMany times, the notion of information is used in such a way that the following two theses are suggested: 1) that the world might be no more than information, and 2) that our minds might be no more that information. This paper rejects both theses. In relation to that, I will argue for the need to take into account non-informational aspects of reality that are epistemically accessible. Only that way, we could deal with the problem of selecting a determinate semantic content and with the problem of error. The two more common strategies to deal with these problems appeal to some primitive “referential capacities” or to some special kinds of (natural) “functions”. We propose another strategy based on very simple processes of signalization. With the help of that strategy, we offer a new way of defining semantic content.https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/101Informationphysical propertiessemantic contentmindsignalsreferential capacitiesfunctionsnon-informational access. |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Antonio Manuel Liz |
spellingShingle |
Antonio Manuel Liz World and mind, information and semantic content tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique Information physical properties semantic content mind signals referential capacities functions non-informational access. |
author_facet |
Antonio Manuel Liz |
author_sort |
Antonio Manuel Liz |
title |
World and mind, information and semantic content |
title_short |
World and mind, information and semantic content |
title_full |
World and mind, information and semantic content |
title_fullStr |
World and mind, information and semantic content |
title_full_unstemmed |
World and mind, information and semantic content |
title_sort |
world and mind, information and semantic content |
publisher |
tripleC |
series |
tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique |
issn |
1726-670X 1726-670X |
publishDate |
2009-11-01 |
description |
Many times, the notion of information is used in such a way that the following two theses are suggested: 1) that the world might be no more than information, and 2) that our minds might be no more that information. This paper rejects both theses. In relation to that, I will argue for the need to take into account non-informational aspects of reality that are epistemically accessible. Only that way, we could deal with the problem of selecting a determinate semantic content and with the problem of error. The two more common strategies to deal with these problems appeal to some primitive “referential capacities” or to some special kinds of (natural) “functions”. We propose another strategy based on very simple processes of signalization. With the help of that strategy, we offer a new way of defining semantic content. |
topic |
Information physical properties semantic content mind signals referential capacities functions non-informational access. |
url |
https://www.triple-c.at/index.php/tripleC/article/view/101 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT antoniomanuelliz worldandmindinformationandsemanticcontent |
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1725155273673277440 |