Pricing in Noncooperative Interference Channels for Improved Energy Efficiency

• Main Authors: Zhijiat Chong, Rami Mochaourab, Eduard Jorswieck
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: SpringerOpen 2010-01-01
• Series: EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking
• Online Access: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/704614

We consider noncooperative energy-efficient resource allocation in the interference channel. Energy efficiency is achieved when each system pays a price proportional to its allocated transmit power. In noncooperative game-theoretic notation, the power allocation chosen by the systems corresponds to the Nash equilibrium. We study the existence and characterize the uniqueness of this equilibrium. Afterwards, pricing to achieve energy-efficiency is examined. We introduce an arbitrator who determines the prices that satisfy minimum QoS requirements and minimize total power consumption. This energy-efficient assignment problem is formulated and solved. We compare our setting to that without pricing with regard to energy-efficiency by simulation. It is observed that pricing in this distributed setting achieves higher energy-efficiency in different interference regimes.