Research on Supply Chain Governance Strategy: game value analysis based on Incomplete Contract Theory

• Main Author: Wang Luyao
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: EDP Sciences 2021-01-01
• Series: E3S Web of Conferences
• Online Access: https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2021/33/e3sconf_aesee2021_02016.pdf

There are potential opportunistic risks in the partnerships of enterprises in different industries. Asymmetric information, incomplete decision-making and Human bounded rationality are factors for the formation of opportunistic risks, and adopting external governance is a feasible way to defuse the risks. Supply chain governance is a new type of governance which is different from enterprise governance. Its scope of governance is wider than enterprise governance. It is the performance of environmental evolution and organizational innovation. Based on the incomplete contract, this paper analyzes the game between the supplier and the manufacturer. It is found that in the process of the game, the cooperation benefits of both parties are the largest and the distribution of benefits is the fairest. Therefore, combined with the theory of supply chain governance, this paper hopes to maximize the value of supply chain by optimizing the supply chain governance strategy under the condition of incomplete contract.