A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model

Energy storage technology plays a significant role in the pursuit of the high-quality development of the electricity market. Many regions in China have issued policies and regulations of different intensities for promoting the popularization of the energy storage industry. Based on a variety of init...

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Main Authors: Ting Zhang, Shuaishuai Cao, Lingying Pan, Chenyu Zhou
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2020-11-01
Series:Energies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/23/6293
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spelling doaj-7b2e32b741e2492ba6f071951bc7adec2020-11-30T00:00:11ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732020-11-01136293629310.3390/en13236293A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game ModelTing Zhang0Shuaishuai Cao1Lingying Pan2Chenyu Zhou3Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, ChinaBusiness School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, ChinaBusiness School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, ChinaBusiness School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, ChinaEnergy storage technology plays a significant role in the pursuit of the high-quality development of the electricity market. Many regions in China have issued policies and regulations of different intensities for promoting the popularization of the energy storage industry. Based on a variety of initial conditions of different regions, this paper explores the evolutionary process of electricity market players considering energy storage technology. The trilateral evolutionary game model is adopted to analyze the strategies of the power plant, the power grid, and the government. After assigning the model according to an actual situation, each equilibrium point corresponds to a real electricity market situation. The results indicate the following: 1) In the process of stabilizing, the role of “Advanced Imitators” leading the strategy of building energy storage changes between the power plant and the power grid. 2) In Eastern, Middle, and Southern China, the power plants and power grids on a greater-than-medium scale will choose to build energy storage without governmental regulations, due to the abundant net profit. 3) In the northeast of China, power plants with a medium-or-lower scale will choose not to build energy storage because of the relatively low on-grid price, and small power grids can make enough profits by operating energy storage facilities. 4) In Northern China, the large power plants and the medium power grids will choose to build energy storage due to the high electricity sale price and the resulting high profit. 5) In Western China, the small power plants and power grids cannot afford to build energy storage due to the low electricity price. The results lead to valuable policy suggestions for the local governments of China in promoting energy storage in the future. To meet the goal of energy storage popularization, regional electricity market plans need relevant policies based on its existing conditions, offering suitable external conditions for adding energy storage.https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/23/6293energy storageChina’s regional electricity marketevolutionary game model
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ting Zhang
Shuaishuai Cao
Lingying Pan
Chenyu Zhou
spellingShingle Ting Zhang
Shuaishuai Cao
Lingying Pan
Chenyu Zhou
A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model
Energies
energy storage
China’s regional electricity market
evolutionary game model
author_facet Ting Zhang
Shuaishuai Cao
Lingying Pan
Chenyu Zhou
author_sort Ting Zhang
title A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model
title_short A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model
title_full A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model
title_fullStr A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model
title_full_unstemmed A Policy Effect Analysis of China’s Energy Storage Development Based on a Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Model
title_sort policy effect analysis of china’s energy storage development based on a multi-agent evolutionary game model
publisher MDPI AG
series Energies
issn 1996-1073
publishDate 2020-11-01
description Energy storage technology plays a significant role in the pursuit of the high-quality development of the electricity market. Many regions in China have issued policies and regulations of different intensities for promoting the popularization of the energy storage industry. Based on a variety of initial conditions of different regions, this paper explores the evolutionary process of electricity market players considering energy storage technology. The trilateral evolutionary game model is adopted to analyze the strategies of the power plant, the power grid, and the government. After assigning the model according to an actual situation, each equilibrium point corresponds to a real electricity market situation. The results indicate the following: 1) In the process of stabilizing, the role of “Advanced Imitators” leading the strategy of building energy storage changes between the power plant and the power grid. 2) In Eastern, Middle, and Southern China, the power plants and power grids on a greater-than-medium scale will choose to build energy storage without governmental regulations, due to the abundant net profit. 3) In the northeast of China, power plants with a medium-or-lower scale will choose not to build energy storage because of the relatively low on-grid price, and small power grids can make enough profits by operating energy storage facilities. 4) In Northern China, the large power plants and the medium power grids will choose to build energy storage due to the high electricity sale price and the resulting high profit. 5) In Western China, the small power plants and power grids cannot afford to build energy storage due to the low electricity price. The results lead to valuable policy suggestions for the local governments of China in promoting energy storage in the future. To meet the goal of energy storage popularization, regional electricity market plans need relevant policies based on its existing conditions, offering suitable external conditions for adding energy storage.
topic energy storage
China’s regional electricity market
evolutionary game model
url https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/23/6293
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