The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert

In his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology. Whereas some of the more mainstream theories in the humanities would dissolve such objects into their material constituents or their various effects on others, object-oriented social...

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Main Authors: Kleinherenbrink Arjen, Gusman Simon
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2018-08-01
Series:Open Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0007
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spelling doaj-7ae28bc8a0c64d72af2c5b519297e1242021-09-05T20:51:23ZengDe GruyterOpen Philosophy2543-88752018-08-0111799310.1515/opphil-2018-0007opphil-2018-0007The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-InertKleinherenbrink Arjen0Gusman Simon1Radboud University,Nijmegen, NetherlandsRadboud University,Nijmegen, NetherlandsIn his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology. Whereas some of the more mainstream theories in the humanities would dissolve such objects into their material constituents or their various effects on others, object-oriented social theory theorizes them as inert, resilient entities with a private reality that exceeds their components and actions. Harman’s theory focuses on what social entities are qua objects, and consequently says little about their specificity as social objects. A more complete social theory would also outline how human existence is to be understood in relation to a social world comprised of discrete and inert entities, as opposed to, for example, far more continuous material fields or networks of associations. We argue that an unexpected yet solid candidate for such an extension of object-oriented social theory already exists in Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of practico-inert being and group formation. We first outline Harman’s and Sartre’s respective ontologies of social objects, and then discuss how their many complementarities make the latter a suitable extension of the former.https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0007social objectsobject-oriented ontologyimmaterialismsymbiosisinertiapractico-inertjean-paul sartregraham harman
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Kleinherenbrink Arjen
Gusman Simon
spellingShingle Kleinherenbrink Arjen
Gusman Simon
The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert
Open Philosophy
social objects
object-oriented ontology
immaterialism
symbiosis
inertia
practico-inert
jean-paul sartre
graham harman
author_facet Kleinherenbrink Arjen
Gusman Simon
author_sort Kleinherenbrink Arjen
title The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert
title_short The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert
title_full The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert
title_fullStr The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert
title_full_unstemmed The Ontology of Social Objects: Harman’s Immaterialism and Sartre’s Practico-Inert
title_sort ontology of social objects: harman’s immaterialism and sartre’s practico-inert
publisher De Gruyter
series Open Philosophy
issn 2543-8875
publishDate 2018-08-01
description In his recent Immaterialism, Graham Harman develops a theory of social objects based on his object-oriented ontology. Whereas some of the more mainstream theories in the humanities would dissolve such objects into their material constituents or their various effects on others, object-oriented social theory theorizes them as inert, resilient entities with a private reality that exceeds their components and actions. Harman’s theory focuses on what social entities are qua objects, and consequently says little about their specificity as social objects. A more complete social theory would also outline how human existence is to be understood in relation to a social world comprised of discrete and inert entities, as opposed to, for example, far more continuous material fields or networks of associations. We argue that an unexpected yet solid candidate for such an extension of object-oriented social theory already exists in Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of practico-inert being and group formation. We first outline Harman’s and Sartre’s respective ontologies of social objects, and then discuss how their many complementarities make the latter a suitable extension of the former.
topic social objects
object-oriented ontology
immaterialism
symbiosis
inertia
practico-inert
jean-paul sartre
graham harman
url https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0007
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