GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA

Any analysis of the erratic unfolding of global economic crisis is bound to be hotly contested. This is particularly so in mid-1999, amid claims from Washington that the past two years' dangers of financial meltdown and deflation were averted and finally extinguished through a combination of po...

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Main Author: Patrick Bond
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University Library System, University of Pittsburgh 2015-08-01
Series:Journal of World-Systems Research
Online Access:http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/article/view/138
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spelling doaj-7a9ac24c46c3440689d20a04a1f92cd92020-11-24T23:12:22ZengUniversity Library System, University of PittsburghJournal of World-Systems Research1076-156X2015-08-015241245510.5195/jwsr.1999.138132GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICAPatrick Bond0University of KwaZulu-Natal,DURBANAny analysis of the erratic unfolding of global economic crisis is bound to be hotly contested. This is particularly so in mid-1999, amid claims from Washington that the past two years' dangers of financial meltdown and deflation were averted and finally extinguished through a combination of policy measures and good fortune: slightly looser Federal Reserve monetary policy adopted in September 1998, in the immediate wake of the successful public-private bailout of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund; a new $90 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) insurance scheme announced the following month; the convening of key countries in a Forum on Financial Stability; the lack of financial contagion (contrary to expectations) in the wake of Brazil's January 1999 currency meltdown; the long-awaited revival (however infirm) of the Japanese economy; new plans for somewhat more transparent budgetary and exchange rate systems in emerging markets; and a decision at the G-8 Cologne meeting in June 1999 to sell 10% of the IMF's gold to fund partial debt relief for the poorest Third World countries. Indeed many observers were surprised at IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus's success at turning the debt relief strategy into a vehicle for tougher "Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility" conditions, just months after the IMF was criticised to the point of ridicule for its East Asian, Russian and Brazilian mishaps (effectively, granting $200 billion in bad loans over 15 months, in exchange for the application of inappropriate austerity measures).http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/article/view/138
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Patrick Bond
spellingShingle Patrick Bond
GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA
Journal of World-Systems Research
author_facet Patrick Bond
author_sort Patrick Bond
title GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA
title_short GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA
title_full GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA
title_fullStr GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA
title_full_unstemmed GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS: A VIEW FROM SOUTH AFRICA
title_sort global economic crisis: a view from south africa
publisher University Library System, University of Pittsburgh
series Journal of World-Systems Research
issn 1076-156X
publishDate 2015-08-01
description Any analysis of the erratic unfolding of global economic crisis is bound to be hotly contested. This is particularly so in mid-1999, amid claims from Washington that the past two years' dangers of financial meltdown and deflation were averted and finally extinguished through a combination of policy measures and good fortune: slightly looser Federal Reserve monetary policy adopted in September 1998, in the immediate wake of the successful public-private bailout of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund; a new $90 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) insurance scheme announced the following month; the convening of key countries in a Forum on Financial Stability; the lack of financial contagion (contrary to expectations) in the wake of Brazil's January 1999 currency meltdown; the long-awaited revival (however infirm) of the Japanese economy; new plans for somewhat more transparent budgetary and exchange rate systems in emerging markets; and a decision at the G-8 Cologne meeting in June 1999 to sell 10% of the IMF's gold to fund partial debt relief for the poorest Third World countries. Indeed many observers were surprised at IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus's success at turning the debt relief strategy into a vehicle for tougher "Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility" conditions, just months after the IMF was criticised to the point of ridicule for its East Asian, Russian and Brazilian mishaps (effectively, granting $200 billion in bad loans over 15 months, in exchange for the application of inappropriate austerity measures).
url http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/jwsr/article/view/138
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