Optimal design of securitization in a principal-agent relationship based on Bayesian inference for moral hazard
In the securitization process, by selling the mortgage loans to risk-lover investors, originator can allocate the mortgage loans risk to them. In this case, originator may not have an incentive to screen out borrowers, resulting in the moral hazard problem. This paper, within a principal-agent frame...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | fas |
| Published: |
University of Tehran
2015-03-01
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| Series: | تحقیقات مالی |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://jfr.ut.ac.ir/article_50708_d74f10f8eb9b81e5c7b0c1ffc555a436.pdf |